

FUNDAMENTALS

Hartmut Traub: I and Thou - Aspects of a theory of interpersonal dynamics as contained in Rudolf Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom

Johannes Wagemann: Herbert Witzenmann's Path to the Philosophical Sources of Anthroposophy

PART IV: CONCEPTIONAL FRAMEWORK / RAHMENKONZEPTE

Clare Bennetts: Implementing animal welfare studies into the secondary curriculum

Clare Bennetts: La implementación del estudio sobre bienestar animal en el currículo de la enseñanza secundaria

BOOK REVIEW

Helmut Zander: Die Anthroposophie. Rudolf Steiners Ideen zwischen Esoterik, Weleda, Demeter und Waldorfpädagogik. Von Johannes Kiersch (Deutsch)

Helmut Zander: Anthroposophy. Rudolf Steiner's Ideas from Esotericism to Weleda, Demeter and Waldorf Education. By Johannes Kiersch

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Editorial

Axel Föller-Mancini

Die aktuelle Ausgabe von *RoSE – Research on Steiner Education* umfasst Beiträge zur geisteswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung, Artikel zur Didaktik der Waldorfpädagogik sowie eine aktuelle Buchbesprechung.

Die Rubrik Grundlagenforschung eröffnet Hartmut Traub mit einer englischsprachigen Version seines Artikels „Ich und Du“ (RoSE Vol X, Nr. 1). Er untersucht Aspekte zu einer Theorie der Interpersonalität in Steiners „Die Philosophie der Freiheit“ und stellt sie in den Zusammenhang der Philosophiegeschichte. Johannes Wagemann zeigt, wie im publizistischen Werk des Steinerschülers Herbert Witzmann Momente persönlicher Begegnungen und philosophischer Auseinandersetzungen zu einer außerordentlichen Werkgenese im anthroposophischen Kontext beitragen. Auch dieser Beitrag ist eine Übersetzung ins Englische und wird hier mit einem ersten Teil wiedergegeben. In der Ausgabe Vol. XI, Nr. 1 wird der zweite Teil folgen.

Mit dem Beitrag *Implementing animal welfare studies into the secondary curriculum* plädiert die Australierin Clare Bennetts dafür, den pädagogischen Umgang mit Tieren vielfältig zu nutzen. Ein zu stiftender emotionaler Bezug solle für eine artgerechte Tierhaltung und für Fragen der menschlichen Ernährung sensibilisieren. Ein ausgearbeitetes didaktisches Konzept könnte später Eingang in den Unterricht der Sekundarstufe an Waldorfschulen finden.

Johannes Kiersch setzt sich zum Abschluss dieser Edition mit Helmut Zanders neu erschienenem Buch *Die Anthroposophie. Rudolf Steiners Ideen zwischen Esoterik, Weleda, Demeter und Waldorfpädagogik* auseinander. Der ausgewiesene Steinerkritiker analysiert vor allem die praktischen Felder, die aus dem anthroposophischen Impuls entstanden sind und zeichnet ihre Genese und Bedingungskontexte nach.

Allen LeserInnen und AutorInnen wünschen wir eine anregende Lektüre!

Editorial

Axel Föllner-Mancini

The current edition of *RoSE - Research on Steiner Education* includes two articles on theoretical fundamentals, an article on didactics of Waldorf education, and a book review of a recent publication.

The section on *theoretical fundamentals* is opened by Hartmut Traub with an English version of his article “I and Thou” (RoSE Vol X, No. 1). He explores certain aspects of a theory of inter-personality in Steiner’s main philosophical work (“The Philosophy of Freedom”), and places it in context within the history of philosophy. Following this, Johannes Wagemann shows how moments of personal encounter and philosophical debates in the writing work of Steiner’s pupil Herbert Witzgenmann inspired an extraordinary amount of new writing within the context of anthroposophy. The second part also translated into English will be published in Vol. XI, No. 1.

In her article, *Implementing animal welfare studies into the secondary curriculum*, the Australian Clare Bennetts advocates using the pedagogical approach to animals in a variety of ways. An emotional connection is created to raise awareness of animal welfare and issues related to human nutrition. This developed didactic concept can be implemented in secondary school instruction at Waldorf schools.

At the end of this edition, Johannes Kiersch summarizes Helmut Zander’s newly published book *Die Anthroposophie. Rudolf Steiners Ideen zwischen Esoterik, Weleda, Demeter und Waldorfpädagogik*. Zander’s critical perspective focuses on the practical fields that have arisen from the anthroposophical impulse and their contextual conditions and genesis.

We wish all readers and authors an inspiring reading!

Editorial

Axel Föllner-Mancini

La edición actual de *RoSE - Research on Steiner Education* incluye dos artículos sobre fundamentos teóricos, un artículo sobre didáctica de la educación Waldorf y la revisión de un libro publicado recientemente.

Hartmut Traub abre la sección de Fundamentos Teóricos con una versión en inglés de su artículo “Ich und Du” (RoSE Vol X, No. 1). El autor examina aspectos de una teoría de la interpersonalidad en “*Filosofía de la Libertad*” de Steiner y los coloca en el contexto de la historia de la filosofía. En la misma sección, Johannes Wagemann demuestra cómo los momentos de encuentros interpersonales y los debates filosóficos contribuyeron a una génesis extraordinaria (en el contexto antroposófico) en el trabajo analítico de Herbert Witzemann, un estudiante de Rudolf Steiner. La segunda parte de este artículo en inglés será incluida en el Vol. XI, No. 1.

En su artículo, *Implementación del estudio sobre el bienestar animal en el currículo de la enseñanza secundaria*, la autora australiana Clare Bennetts aboga por utilizar el enfoque pedagógico sobre el bienestar animal de varias maneras. Para tal fin, es necesario crear una conexión emocional para poder promover conciencia sobre el cuidado animal y los problemas relacionados con la nutrición humana. Este concepto didáctico puede ser implementado en la enseñanza secundaria en las escuelas Waldorf.

En la última sección de esta edición, Johannes Kiersch presenta el libro *La Antroposofía. Die Anthroposophie. Rudolf Steiners Ideen zwischen Esoterik, Weleda, Demeter und Waldorfpädagogik*. Este libro es una publicación reciente de Helmut Zander, un conocido crítico de Rudolf Steiner. Su perspectiva crítica se centra en los campos prácticos que han surgido del impulso antroposófico y de las condiciones contextuales y su génesis.

¡Deseamos a todos nuestros lectores y autores una lectura inspiradora!

I and Thou - Aspects of a theory of interpersonal dynamics as contained in Rudolf Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom

Hartmut Traub

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1. A few milestones in the historical development of the idea of interpersonal dynamics

No You, no I; no I, no You (Fichte 1834, SW I, 189).¹ With this statement of principle Fichte – in *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* – establishes that human life is essentially correlative in nature, a condition of being, characterised by the reciprocally determinative effects of I on You, and You on I. Involvement with the Other both defines and forms the existence of the human individual – in a *constitutive* way. This is expressed in Fichte's second statement of principle, which says: "The human being [...] only becomes a human being among other human beings." (SW III, 39)

The question of the ontologically constitutive character of mutually determinative human involvement is considered, in the history of philosophical problems, under the rubric of interpersonal dynamics or inter-subjectivity.²

Since its first *philosophical* exposition at the beginning of the 18th century the I-You relationship has been discussed many times, and not only in philosophy, but also in theology and psychology. Its currently best known *philosophical* treatment is probably Martin Buber's *I and Thou*, together with a further development of his thinking, the *Dialogical Principle* (Buber 2009, 5-136). The multi-faceted development of "dialogical thinking", since its inception with Heinrich Jacobi (ibid. 301), then via Fichte and Feuerbach into the 20th century with Karl Jaspers and others, has been critically documented by Buber in "Zur Geschichte des dialogischen Prinzips" ("On the history of the dialogical principle") (ibid. 299-320).³ More recently the line of dialogical thinking has been extended to include the process of the "free-ranging dialogue" and the

1. In what follows the quotations from Fichte will be taken from *Fichtes sämtliche Werke*, ed. by I. H. Fichte. Berlin 1834-1846, cited as SW.

2. The varying designation of the I-Thou relationship either in terms of the inter-personal or the inter-subjective denotes a significant slant in emphasis, both in theoretical and existential terms, in the way the analysis of this subject is conducted. We will have occasion to go into this in more detail in what follows.

3. It is questionable whether Buber's contention that one can only speak of dialogical thinking or a dialogical principle within the explicit context of the I-Thou relationship is tenable. Dialogical thinking, at least as a methodological principle, is present in platonic dialectics and the associated conversational form of the Socratic dialogues. Furthermore, it is a moot point whether in the context of human history the dialogical nature of human interaction is in any way a universal principle of living development that expresses itself in a species-specific manner. The implication of this – if we wished to considerably extend the concept of the Logos – is that the duetting of blackbirds or the songs of whales could be construed as dialogical forms. A further interesting instance of the I-Thou relationship is the "inner dialogue", upon which such stress was laid by the Protestant reformers, and which Kant dubbed "the inner court of justice" in his moral philosophy.

closely related “consensus theory of truth”, both of which have been developed by K. O. Apel (1976) and J. Habermas (1991) within the context of *discursive ethics*.⁴

Outside of philosophy the I-Thou relationship also plays a significant role in theology and psychology. Karl Barth, one of the most important theologians of the 20th century declares: “To be human [is] to have our being defined by the presence of another human being.” (Barth, 1992, p.296) That means the *ens humanum* is not ascribed to the human being as an anthropological constant, but grows out of and manifests in interaction with the other. And for the psychotherapist and anthropologist Viktor Frankl this represents the only possibility of complete self-realisation:

“To be fully human and come to full self-realisation is only possible to the extent that I transcend myself in relation to something or someone existing in the world.” (Frankl, 2018, p.53)

In the history of ideas this theme of reciprocal interpersonal dynamics, the determining of the full meaning of what it is to be human by the self-transcendent relation to a Thou-experience, is connected to a second fundamental aspect of the process of self-discovery, namely that of *acknowledgement*. Subjectively, human beings can think of themselves in a host of different ways – as long as they have attained a certain level of self-reflection. In the inner realms of consciousness there is no limit to the diversity of possible self-images. *Objectively*, however, a person's being is founded upon their acknowledgement by Another, be it in metaphysical-theological terms as the beloved and chosen image of God, or in socio-political terms as an individual with inviolable dignity, or through being appreciated in a social context with which they are familiar.

In the history of ideas there are, in philosophy and theology, also highly influential theories around this acknowledgement dimension in the ontology of interpersonal interaction. This goes especially for the classical period of German philosophy, which had such a formative effect on Steiner. Thus in Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in the chapter on the constitution of consciousness, we find: “They [two individuals meeting] acknowledge themselves as each acknowledging the other” (Hegel, 1807, p.147). And it is only through this meeting with the other, the stranger, that consciousness constitutes itself explicitly as the awareness of a particular self, as self-consciousness. The special meaning of the mutual acknowledgement of I and Thou was also portrayed by Fichte, in *Grundlage des Naturrechts*, in the following terms:

“The relationship of free beings to one another is [...] one characterised by the reciprocal effects of intelligence and freedom. For one to be able to acknowledge the other, they both must participate in mutual acknowledgement. And neither can treat the other as a free being if they do not treat each other as free beings.” (Fichte, 1834, SW III, p.44)

However, this largely positive connotation of the acknowledgement and objectification of the other through the mutual affirmation of their freedom and the reciprocally respectful attitude that follows from it, has another side to it. The objectification of the subject through “the eyes of the other” also leads to the “exposure” and “defencelessness” of the self before its counterpart. In “the eyes of the other”, according to J-P Sartre, the Self experiences its freedom to make an object of itself. “Thus for me the other [...] is the being for which I am an object, through which I attain my object-ness” (Sartre, 1991, p.486). The Self, however, experiences its object-ness in “the eyes of the other” as estrangement, as “the death of its potentialities”, as “the decentring of its world”, and all this accompanied by the “discomfiture” of the feeling of “shame” (ibid. p.493). With this motif of the other's objectifying act of looking and the concomitant feeling of shame it calls forth in the Self thus observed, Sartre is making a subliminal reference to the biblical motif of the Fall – to the rendering naked and defenceless of the Self before the voice and eyes of the other, who in that context is God. The creature made in the image of God, the human being, fundamentally transforms his relationship to God through disobeying the divine injunction not to eat of the tree of knowledge. Trying to conceal himself, he becomes God's counterpart. God, in seeking him, addresses him as *thou*: “Adam, where art thou?” And Adam answers him ‘in shame’: “I heard Thy voice [...] and was afraid; and I hid myself, for I was naked” (1. Mo 3, 7-9) This thought of the first man being addressed as Thou by the voice of God is, according to

4. Cf. Apel's theoretical account of “reciprocal acknowledgement among equal members of an argumentation community”, in Apel (1976), p.400. In Apel's writings the Buber connection is explicit. Cf. ibid. pp.87f.

Martin Buber, a “highly significant contribution to our deliberations [on the dialogical principle]” made by another theological thinker on inter-personal dynamics, Franz Rosenzweig. God’s addressing of Adam as ‘Thou’ establishes God as the “author and initiator of the whole dialogue between him [God] and the human soul” (Buber, 2009, p.305).

Thus the Self’s openness to the voice and eyes of the other is ambivalent, insofar as it is thereby acknowledged and objectified as a free self, while at the same time being revealed as something enclosed in its own self-protection, being robbed of this and exposed to the gaze and judgement of the other in the painful openness of its object-ness.

The question to be answered in what follows is where does Rudolf Steiner’s thinking stand in relation to the problems of interpersonal dynamics and mutual acknowledgement? According to Buber’s reading of the history of “dialogical thinking”, this is a theme that was charged by powerful impulses emanating from the very tradition to which Steiner was particularly inclined in his philosophical beginnings. In other words, it was “in the air” and under intense discussion in the philosophy and theology of the beginning of the 20th century.

2. Anthroposophy – A Blueprint for “Self-redemption”

It would seem to me that for anthroposophy, as a body of insight into the nature of the human being, all the concepts we have just been considering play no prominent, constitutive or systematic role. It is not couched in terms of the Other, the “Thou” and the type of human understanding, self-realisation and mutual acknowledgement based upon and accruing from the I-Thou relationship. This is no coincidence. The reason for the “blank spot” on this subject in anthroposophy is that in principle its whole approach is oriented towards the “I” or Self. Because anthroposophy – and this includes Steiner’s *Philosophy of Freedom* – is primarily concerned with the discovery, growth and development of “I”-related faculties in relation to knowledge and action, in other words, the autonomous Self and the super-sensible worlds it might open up, such matters as the Other’s view of the Self and the Self’s view of the Other tend to remain peripheral. This does not mean that Steiner completely ignored the world of society and politics. Quite the contrary: society and the traditions that shaped it, the organisation of the state and the economy, and of cultural institutions, the churches and the beliefs they promulgated, all find their place in Steiner’s thinking. Indeed, they find systematic treatment in his three-fold model of society. On the other hand, the field primarily associated with our essential nature opened in the first place by Kierkegaard, namely that of basic human *existence* and the interpersonal “world of immediate co-presence” associated with it, have scarcely any meaning for Steiner’s anthropology and theory of the constitution of self-awareness or the “I”. His main concern, in pursuance of the idea of perfectionism, is more with “the soul’s upward striving towards freedom”, and what interests him is the concept of philosophy as “almost exclusively the province of individual (inner) experience” (Steiner, 1987, 232f).⁵ These utterances of Steiner’s, relating as they do to the publication of *The Philosophy of Freedom* in 1894, are paradigmatic.⁶ Much later he also expressed himself on the subject of the attainment of anthroposophical knowledge in almost identical words and in the same introspective tone. Thus, in the afterword to the eighth edition of *Knowledge of the Higher Worlds* in 1918, we find: “What the human soul goes through on the path intended here occurs entirely in the realm of purely spiritual experience” (Steiner, 1993, p. 216). And on this path the important thing is that “an inner exertion [is possible] which will enable the thinking part of inner life to be experienced as distinct [from all bodily process]”, and this in turn is to render possible the experience of “super-sensible revelations” (ibid. pp. 217-220). On this path of spiritual self-optimisation and perfection the Other as Thou plays no constitutive role, but far rather a peripheral

5. Steiner’s writings are quoted according to the *Rudolf Steiner Gesamtausgabe* Dornach (GA) and *Rudolf Steiner Schriften – Kritische Ausgabe*, ed. Christian Clement, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt (SKA).

6. These utterances of Steiner’s and the attitude they express must be viewed in connection with the persistent influence of Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* and its ideal of the solitary thinker. Steiner’s letters to Rosa Mayreder and Pauline Specht, written in 1894, expressly draw the parallel between *The Philosophy of Freedom* and Nietzsche, and in such a way that one could be forgiven for thinking he actually addressed the book to Nietzsche (cf. GA 39, pp. 232 & 238f.).

one – that of teacher or instructor (cf. *ibid.* 221f.). Thus, when Helmut Zander speaks of anthroposophy as a method of “self-redemption”, there is something in what he says.⁷

Nonetheless, there is another side to anthroposophy, and the *Philosophy of Freedom* in particular contains a number of noteworthy thoughts on cultural and moral philosophy that counter its dominant, basic tendency towards human self-realisation via the internalisation and vitalisation of the super-sensible. While they cannot completely undermine the previously mentioned impression of anthroposophy as a theory of self-redemption, nor entirely undo its strongly “I”-based monism⁸, they can at least counteract these dominant tendencies.⁹

Systematic consideration of these counteractive aspects opens up a hitherto little known, but nonetheless noteworthy view of Steiner's thinking on the ontological elements of the structure of human interaction. This view of the relationship between I and Thou is both anthroposophical and relevant to the general theory of communication.

3. The long reach of Steiner's reply to Eduard von Hartmann's charge of solipsism

On 1st November 1894 Rudolf Steiner writes a revealing letter to Eduard von Hartmann. It concerns the latter's review of *The Philosophy of Freedom*, which appeared in the same year. The central issue Steiner takes up with Hartmann is his critical assertion that the “ethical individualism” that Steiner advances in the second part of *The Philosophy of Freedom*, “leads inevitably to solipsism, [...] illusionism and agnosticism, [and thus stands in danger] of sliding into the abyss of non-philosophy” (Steiner, 1994, GA 4a, p.420).

What is Hartmann's criticism about? In contradistinction to Kant, Steiner had maintained, and attempted to justify, that the foundation of moral maxims is not to be derived from subjecting them to scrutiny by means of the categorical imperative and thereby converting them into duties; rather, if our freedom is to be real, they should arise from individual moral intuition. (SKA 2, pp.204-213).¹⁰ This individualisation of moral principles by means of a subjective source of knowledge, namely intuition, had evidently given Hartmann the impression that Steiner's position was that the basis of morality is purely subjective. Nor had this impression been weakened in any way by the fact that Steiner sought to protect intuition from the charge of moral arbitrariness by characterising it as the ability to think universal concepts and ideas.¹¹ But the accusation that *The Philosophy of Freedom* led to “solipsism” and “illusionism” and was in danger of sliding into “the abyss of non-philosophy” was still there. And Steiner could not possibly let it stand.

His reply to Hartmann's complaints is remarkable, both in itself and in regard to its lasting relevance within the history of his works. It consists mainly of two arguments in rebuttal of Hartmann's criticism. In the first of these he grants that he can be seen as guilty of solipsism, albeit only on condition that he holds with Schopenhauer's axiom: “...the world is my mental picture.”¹² But this, he says, is not the case. Against the “immanence theory” (Steiner, 1987, p.226) of subjective idealism imputed to him by Hartmann he maintains:

7. H. Zander (2019), pp. 61f and *passim*, p.207.

8. Cf. Steiner's essay “Der Individualismus in der Philosophie” (1899) in Steiner, 1961, pp. 99-152.

9. In the line of masking out this subject in favour of the primacy of “self-redemption” we find the anthroposophically inspired anthology *Rudolf Steiner's “Philosophie der Freiheit – eine Menschenkunde des höheren Selbst*, edited by K. M. Dietz and published in 1994. Not one of the authors in this volume so much as mentions the subject of interpersonal dynamics, let alone gives it systematic treatment. By contrast, Herbert Witzmann, in his essay of 1985 “Das Erwachen am anderen Menschen” had already drawn attention to “interpersonal” aspects of the *Philosophy of Freedom*, as well as the significance of this subject for “the community life of the Anthroposophical Society” (Steiner, quoted in Witzmann, 1985, p.39). We will be looking more closely at this essay in what follows. I owe my knowledge of this essay to Prof. J. Schieren.

10. Cf. H. Traub 2011, pp.744-791.

11. Hartmann later addressed this argument in a letter of 13th June 1897 (Steiner, 1987, pp. 357f.). We will consider this more closely in what follows.

12. Steiner was very familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophy, especially his main work *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. In the 1890's he was in fact working for the publisher Cotta on an edition of Schopenhauer's works.

“I cannot go along with the step by which the given, empirical world is absorbed into consciousness. This is why I am not a phenomenalist either. For me the empirically given content of the world is not the content of consciousness” (ibid.).

This means that Steiner fundamentally insists – and also where it is a question of the individual intuiting of universal moral ideas, in other words, of the content of the “moral imagination” (ibid.) – that he is an empiricist and a realist. Exactly what kind of reality we are talking about in connection with ideas in the field of moral imagination need not be decided here. Here it is only important to point out how things stand. For this clarification lays the foundation for the discussion of a further theme – a theme that, as far as I can see, has been given very little attention in the research literature on Steiner’s philosophical worldview. Nonetheless, it is fundamentally significant for the later unfolding of anthroposophy and its various fields of practical application, education in particular, but also medicine. This is the theme adumbrated in our introduction, namely, that of interpersonal dynamics.

The actual issue the letter to Hartmann is concerned with is a question of moral philosophy, namely, what are the conditions under which the moral intuitions of “individual minds” can find consensus (ibid., p.226)? In this 1894 letter to Hartmann Steiner expresses in a compressed form something which he had already formulated in chapter IX of *The Philosophy of Freedom*, namely:

“It is only because human individuals are one in spirit that they can live their very different lives side by side” (SKA 2, p.187).¹³

Contra Hartmann the letter continues:

“The moral ideal that I [as an individualisation of consciousness] hold in mind is numerically identical to the [ideal] held in mind by someone else. This only *seems* not to be the case, because it [the moral ideal] is connected with certain perceptions of the [sensory] world, which are not numerically identical with the organic individuals concerned. But the only reason these are not numerically identical is because they are spatio-temporal entities. Where the concepts of *space* and *time* cease to have meaning, however, as in the sphere of ethics, that is where it also becomes impossible to speak of the *numerically different*” (Steiner, 1987, p.226).

Steiner now admits to Hartmann that his book has a shortcoming, in that it did not solve this problem of mediation between individuality and universality in a satisfactory way. He nevertheless expresses the hope that Hartmann’s notes would “come in useful if he should get the chance to publish his thoughts on the matter in some new context” (ibid., 228). And this is exactly what happened. In the “First Appendix” to the new edition of *The Philosophy of Freedom* in 1918 (SKA 2, pp.251-256) Steiner turns once more to the loose ends of his dispute with Eduard von Hartmann on the subject of interpersonal dynamics. The appendix’s opening words are:

“Objections of a philosophical nature which were voiced to me immediately after the appearance of this book prompt me to add the following short commentary to this new edition” (SKA 2, p.251).

And in a few sentences Steiner is once more in *medias res*, in other words, engaged in the exposition of the question posed by Hartmann in 1894 as to “the possible effects of the soul-life of another person upon one’s (the subject’s) own” (ibid.). And the problem so “absurdly” imputed to Steiner by Hartmann, that of “solipsism”, the assumption that “other people only live within my mind” (ibid., pp.259f) is once more on the table.

In 1918, twenty-four extremely busy years after the first publication of *The Philosophy of Freedom* – years in which Steiner had developed from philosopher to theosophist to anthroposophist – he feels it necessary to take up once more the old questions of the nature of spiritual and moral interaction, as well as their “epistemological status”, in an attempt to solve this “leftover” problem in some way.¹⁴

On the context of this idea and its further development, see Traub (2011), p.843. 13.

14. In 1897 Hartmann countered Steiner once more in a letter of 13th June. We will return to it later. When Steiner speaks of “Objections which were voiced to me immediately after the appearance of this book” (SKA 2, p.251), then the question is whether in 1918 he was incorporating this 1897 reply of Hartmann’s into his exposition, for this cannot readily be construed as “immediately after the appearance of this book”.

The fact that he took this step at this stage of his life and of the development of his ideas serves to show that this subject of interpersonal dynamics – the relationship between “I and Thou” – is not something artificially tacked onto Steiner's thinking within the context of *The Philosophy of Freedom*. Steiner quite evidently felt it was important to place this issue once more on the horizon of his philosophy and of anthroposophy.¹⁵ Unfortunately there is nowhere I know of where Steiner has given this theme systematic treatment, or dealt in depth with its implications for philosophy and anthroposophy. Nevertheless, *The Philosophy of Freedom* – in the “ultimate questions” contained in the chapter “The Reality of Freedom” in part two, and in the “Appendix” – and the previously quoted letter offer sufficient material for the development of the basic features of a philosophical conception of interpersonal dynamics. Their further significance and implications are not only worth exploring in the field of personal interaction, but also as they apply to teaching and learning situations in the area of “spiritual leadership” and “spiritual training”, to education and in doctor-patient communication.

4. Strains and dimensions of interpersonal interaction and communication in Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom

In what follows we will explore in detail three passages from *The Philosophy of Freedom* in order to clarify the extent to which Steiner's main philosophical work (and the basis of his later anthroposophy) can be seen as providing points of departure for an original blueprint of a theory of interpersonal dynamics. The fact that Steiner did not give this important theme of modern philosophy and theology – not to speak of sociology and psychology – a chapter to itself in *The Philosophy of Freedom* does not mean that it does not figure in the book. Immediately after the book's publication Steiner himself admitted that its structure and delivery was full of jumps and breaks, and spoke of the urgency of his “longing to get to the conclusion” (Steiner, 1987, p. 232), to which much in the way of discursive completeness had fallen victim (*ibid.*). One of these untreated themes could well have been that of interpersonal dynamics. Steiner was well aware of having sold this theme rather short, and that it needed a more thorough treatment in the spirit of his philosophical and anthroposophical thinking. This is shown by his taking it up again in the first Appendix of the second edition of *The Philosophy of Freedom*, by his interpolation of explanations at places pertinent to this theme in the new edition, and in his addressing this theme in connection with the rebuilding of the Goetheanum after its destruction in 1923.

4.1

Steiner's first answer to Hartmann's solipsism charge relates to a passage in chapter IX of the first edition of *The Philosophy of Freedom*. There Steiner had expounded his thinking on how there could be a “synchronising” of the intuition of moral ideas in different individuals. What is noteworthy about this passage is that it is not concerned with the problem of solipsism flagged by Hartmann, but with the problem of moral atomism. For the question here is: “How are [...] people to have a social life if everyone is only striving to assert his own individuality?” (SKA 2, p.186) In formulating it like this Steiner is distinguishing his interpretation from that of Schopenhauer, for whom only myself as a perceiving subject exists. Against this Steiner assumes a plurality of self-enclosed, individual moral subjects. Factually this is something different from the solipsism Hartmann imputed to him. Steiner's solution to the atomism problem put forward in chapter IX consists in his alluding to the universality of the world of ideas, to which in principle every individual has access. For “the world of ideas that is active in me [is] no other [...] than that active in my fellow humans” (*ibid.*). Accordingly, moral atomism, egoism or individualism (also solipsism) result from analytical concentration on the accidental differences among situations involving the actions of individuals, as well as from the biographical and personal peculiarities infused into these situations by the persons involved in them. If these morally inconsequential idiosyncrasies are left out of account and only the heart of the particular moral

15. The fact that in 1923 Steiner drew particular attention to “awakening interpersonal awareness” as a central category in the development and organization of the Anthroposophical Society makes clear just how strongly he felt about the dimension of interpersonal dynamics also in institutional contexts.

intuition is taken into consideration – on the assumption of Steiner’s realism concerning ideas – then not only is there no contradiction among the maxims for action of the individuals concerned, but it is even possible in this way to establish a moral and spiritual congruency among them. From this it follows that a “moral misunderstanding, a clash [...] among morally *free* people is out of the question.” By excluding contingent situational influences they can “*meet one another* in the same intention, if they are pursuing the same goal” (ibid., p.186, italics mine).

Within the context of the history of philosophical problems what Steiner says here in *The Philosophy of Freedom* may seem like a rehash of Fichte’s idea of “the synthesis of the world of mind” (Fichte 1962 GA III/4, pp.43-53),¹⁶ or a variation on Leibniz’s “pre-established harmony” (Leibniz 1979, pp.24-35), or an anticipation of K. O. Apel’s “a *priori* community of communication” (Apel, 1976, pp.358-435). On closer examination, however, it turns out to have a special accent of its own. Steiner speaks of *meeting*. And this meeting is between not just any individuals or subjects whatsoever, rather it is a “meeting” between “myself and a fellow human being” (SKA 2, p.186). Here Steiner has something else in mind than the possibility of agreement between hypothetical individual subjects. This becomes clear in the appendix which he felt compelled, by Eduard von Hartmann’s criticism, to add to the second edition. Here Steiner makes the dimension of *the meeting of free individuals*, and the single world of moral ideas it provides access to, subject to the dictates of observation and experience. Access to the unity of the world of ideas that I and my fellow human being have in common is “[...] and *must* be the result of experience of the world. For if it were to be apprehended through anything other than observation, then it would be a realm in which no individual experience would be admissible, but only general norms” (ibid.). The motif of “individual experience” based solely upon experience and observation, or the dimension of ‘pertaining to me’ or ‘pertaining to him’ is what for Steiner here makes the qualitative difference between a situation-bound theoretical description of the problem of interpersonal interaction and the *real* experience of interpersonal meeting. At the same time, the experiential and observational quality of the meeting signifies the difference between a hypothetical and a real experience of freedom. Here also, with this idea of the experience-based interpersonal meeting, Steiner shows himself – as was emphasised at the outset – to be an empiricist.¹⁷

This thesis, that Steiner here – and not only here – was concerned to distinguish between purely speculative accounts of interpersonal interaction and those saturated with experience, is supported by two further utterances about the fundamental methodological approach employed in *The Philosophy of Freedom*. In the famous and much quoted letter to Rosa Meyreder of 4th November 1894, Steiner writes:

“I do not theorise; I narrate the events of my inner life. [...] Everything in my book has a personal meaning, [...] every line a personal experience” (Steiner, 1987, pp.232).

In regard to the theme of interpersonal dynamics, this qualification of the – if you will – epistemological method of *The Philosophy of Freedom* serves to underline the experience-based character of the relationship between Steiner’s “I” and its “fellow human-being”. The second utterance on the experience-oriented methodology of *The Philosophy of Freedom* is directed against Eduard von Hartmann, whose criticism Steiner took issue with once more in the first appendix of the book’s second edition, as already mentioned. Here Steiner addresses both von Hartmann’s theory of the unconscious and the criticisms aimed directly at himself (cf. SKA 2, pp.251-256). Apart from the details of this dispute, which we will consider later, what is of particular interest here is Steiner’s clarification of his fundamentally different method. As in the letter to Rosa Meyreder, Steiner emphasises, in addressing von Hartmann, the crucial distinction between an experience-

16. Cf also C. Klotz 2005, pp.43-56

17. K. O. Apel’s *Transformation der Philosophie*, in reference to Martin Buber, puts forward a concept of empiricism, which not only comes remarkably close to Steiner’s experience-oriented thinking on interpersonal dynamics, but particularly also to the approach to education that follows from this concept of experience. “Empiricism that opens new world horizons and possibilities for socially benign life-styles actually exists” (Apel, 1976, vol. 2, p.87). This always arises at those moments “when we are not – as in everyday life and in science – subsuming the data of experience into systems of ready-made rules, but instead manage to achieve a ‘genuine’ perception [...] particularly of other people and their behaviour” (ibid., pp.87f.). In footnote 97 Apel continues: “What this is about has been worked out, in the idea of education and the humanities inspired by existential philosophy in specific connection to M. Buber [...], as the phenomenon of the dialogical ‘encounter’, in: O. Fr. Bollnow, *Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik* (Apel, ibid., pp.88).

oriented and a speculative approach to the theme of interpersonal dynamics. Countering Hartmann, he writes:

“This whole problem [of interpersonal interaction] is to be solved, not through artificial conceptual structures [...], but rather through genuine experience [...]. Thinkers should seek the path to open-minded, spiritually oriented observation; instead of which they insert an artificial conceptual structure between themselves and the reality” (ibid., p.253).

In order to clarify this required change from a philosophically speculative to an experience-oriented approach to the theme of interpersonal interaction, Steiner poses a simple question:

“What is it, in the first instance, that I have before me when I confront another person? I see the features of his immediate appearance” (ibid., p.252).

In beginning the subject of the encounter with another person with the dimension of their immediate features Steiner, in terms of the history of ideas, it would seem, is advancing into the existential dimension, which has unfolded into a significant stream of 20th century philosophy, as in the *Philosophy of the Life-World* (Husserl), *Existential Ontology* (Heidegger/Barth¹⁸) or even Dialogical Philosophy (Buber). That may be something of an exaggerated claim, and indeed would be, were it not for other points of reference in The Philosophy of Freedom that are in keeping with a way of thinking focused specifically on interpersonal dynamics.

4.2 *Communication, participation, the desire to understand*

If the meeting with another person has been conceived in experience-oriented terms, then the question arises, as to how the structure of this situation is to be viewed in the sense of communication and interaction between ‘free spirits’.¹⁹ Conventions and traditional rituals are not going to be of any help for the purpose of determining what is involved in this question. This does not mean that they have no value. It is simply that they cannot grant access to the essential, particular quality of the interactive process in focus here. Steiner deals with this matter particularly in chapters IX (*The Idea of Freedom*) and XII (*Moral Imagination*) and in the chapter called *The Reality of Freedom*.

His analysis on the structure of a process of interpersonal interaction within the context of *The Philosophy of Freedom* comes mainly in passages in chapter XIV (*Individuality and Genus*), in his letter of 1st November 1894 to Eduard von Hartmann and in the first appendix to *The Philosophy of Freedom* of 1918.

In the introduction to the passage of the chapter that concerns us in pursuance of Steiner's thinking on interpersonal dynamics, he makes clear, on the one hand, that the analytical method of scientific thinking is not adequate to giving an account of the core of human individuality. On the other hand, with this repudiation he opens up the path to the qualitative features of interpersonal interaction, that mark it as something special: *communication* and *participation*.

18. So as not to gloss over the historical significance of this fragment of Steiner's thinking on interpersonal dynamics, let us briefly touch on the question of which of these intellectual giants of the 20th century his thinking on “meeting”, “fellow human being” and “free spirit” is most akin to. The one that seems to fit most immediately is Barth's existential description of the “being-ness” of the human being, which he characterizes as a “*condition of being subsisting in the act of meeting another human being*” (Barth, 1992, p.296). Barth and Steiner are also in accord in their strong criticism of abstraction in the description of interpersonal interaction, as they are on the nature of the man Jesus, a being conceptualized by Barth as a “free subject” (ibid., p.251). According to Barth wherever “people are not yet or no longer in possession of their humanity they will have been seen as having an abstract existence, i.e. one abstracted from the co-existence with them of their fellow human beings” (ibid. p.270). Whether Steiner would have been prepared to go along with the idea of “the man Jesus having his free and real being through his fellow-man” as the point of reference for the free but nonetheless interpersonal existence of a particular subject is probably doubtful. These doubts – in relation to Nietzsche and Stirner, who were the greatest influences on him on this point at this time – particularly apply to the “early Steiner” of the 1890's. In contrast, Steiner's *Outline of Occult Science* of 1909 treats “Christ Jesus” as the “ideal” of an “all-embracing brotherhood”, which overcomes solipsism and “alienation” (Steiner, 2013, p.294). In this he approaches a theologically sound conception of interpersonal interaction.

19. On the question of where this topic fits into the body of Steiner research, see Traub (2011), pp.849-851.

“Every kind of study that deals with abstract thoughts and generic concepts is but a preparation for the knowledge we [share] when a human individuality [communicates] to us his way of viewing the world, and on the other hand for the knowledge we get from the content of his acts of will” (SKA 2, p.238, italics mine).²⁰

For the individual Self (“I”) involved here, through the participation in the communication of the other/s²¹ the encounter with him/her/them becomes interpersonal. In seeking to get to the essence of this interpersonal interaction, Steiner’s whole focus is on the “Thou” and what he/she has to communicate. What the Self has to contribute to the situation is a readiness to accept the likelihood that its counterpart is a free individual, who has something original, individual, personal to communicate.

“Whenever we feel that we are dealing with that element in a man which is free from stereotyped thinking and instinctive willing”

then an appropriate reaction is demanded of the Self – and this consists in restraint. In this act of meeting another person

“we must cease to call to our aid any concepts at all of our own making, if we *would understand* him in his essence” (ibid.).

The desire to understand is thus – in addition to communication and participation – the third condition constitutive of the dynamics of interpersonal interaction.²²

The last step taken in chapter XIV on the formulation of the idea of interpersonal dynamics consists in more closely defining participation in the communicative act of a free fellow-individual in terms of ‘the desire to understand’. Steiner does this by making a distinction between our usual knowledge of an object and ‘the exceptional case of knowledge of another person’. While in knowing an object the thinking subject arrives at the sense-transcending, ideal conceptual structure of the object by means of his own cognitive effort (intuition), understanding another person is constituted by our readiness to “take over into our own spirit those concepts by which he [the other person] determines himself, in their pure form (without mixing our own conceptual content with them)” (SKA 2, p.239). It is the phrase in brackets (“without mixing our own conceptual content with them”) that turns interpersonal meeting into mutual understanding. For – and this is Steiner’s critical conclusion of this train of thought –

“Those who immediately mix their own concepts into every judgment about another person, can never arrive at the understanding of an individuality” (ibid.).²³

4.3 Revelation: “extinguish my own thinking – to truly experience another person’s thinking”

Eduard von Hartmann’s off-hand comments on *The Philosophy of Freedom*, especially on the subject of interpersonal interaction, persistently unsettled Steiner’s thinking. In the new edition of the book in 1918 he devoted a whole chapter to this mental discomfort – the *First Appendix*. Here Steiner attempts once more to clarify the essential aspects of his experience-based approach to interpersonal dynamics in relation to von Hartmann’s objections. There was, however, no likelihood that this attempt would find understanding approval from his opponent at this time. Eduard von Hartmann died on 5th June 1906. As a result, Steiner’s considerations acquired a less personal and more systematic character.

20. We would like to point out once more the kinship between R. Steiner and K. Barth in their thinking on interpersonal dynamics. The latter also laid his finger on the qualitative difference between scientific analysis and the experience of really meeting another person. “[W]herever people have been seen as having an abstract existence, i.e. one abstracted from the co-existence with them of their fellow human beings”, according to Barth, “they will not yet or no longer be in possession of their humanity” (Barth, 1992, p.270).

21. In chapter XIV it is also interesting that Steiner, in a remarkable way, speaks out in favour of women’s emancipation: “What a woman is naturally capable of becoming had better be left to the woman herself to decide” (SKA 2, p.237).

22. Elsewhere we have called this Steiner’s “idea of a *theory of understanding* based upon interpersonal dynamics.” See Traub, 2011, p.847.

23. The ‘epoché’ – interpersonal interaction as the desire for mutual understanding – introduced here by Steiner also implies the need for a critical approach to traditional terminologies and established ways of thinking in anthropology, sociology, psychology, not to speak of anthropology. This follows directly from Steiner’s previously described demand for ‘experience-based knowledge’ as opposed to any kind of ‘abstraction in sciences dealing with the nature of the human being’.

We have already spoken about the beginning of the discussion. It makes clear how Steiner means to tackle the problem of interpersonal interaction, namely empirically.

“What is it, in the first instance, that I have before me when I confront another person? I see the features of his immediate appearance” (SKA 2, p.252).

What then follows in the 1918 Appendix takes further and makes more precise what he had already said in chapter XIV (“Individuality and Genus”) in 1894. And this revisiting of the subject certainly gives a much more precise and profound picture of the I-Thou relationship. The encounter with the other, who, as it says in the 1894 text, was “felt” to be a person/individual, is now translated into a terminology of seeing. For

“through the thinking with which I confront the other person, the percept of him becomes, as it were, transparent to the mind” (ibid.).

In both cases this means that in the perception of the other person, insofar as it occurs with due mindfulness (attentive “seeing”), something appears which points beyond the mere sensory image or outward figure. The mindful sensory perception of another person becomes, “as it were”, as “transparent” as something that has not a sensory but an “inner” quality. In 1894 this role was filled by a “feeling” mediated by the presence of the other person, such that

“we feel that we are dealing with that element in a man which is free from stereotyped thinking and instinctive willing” (SKA 2, p.238).

While Steiner's argumentation on both occasions is consistent, insofar as the word “inner” corresponds in anthroposophical terms to the word “feeling”, as used in 1894, this latter term nevertheless goes through a change in 1918. It becomes an obligation, a moral feeling:

“I am bound to admit that when I grasp the percept [the other person] with my thinking, it is not at all the same thing as appeared to the outer senses. In what is a direct appearance to the senses, something else is indirectly revealed” (ibid., p.260).

In “grasping with my thinking” the sensory appearance of another person the immediate sense impression is relativized and “reveals” something else. This relativizing of the purely sensory component in the mindful perception of another person Steiner terms “the [self-extinction] of the mere sense appearance” (ibid.). In extinguishing (or rather “withdrawing”) itself in the act of perceiving another person, the sensory process *reveals* something that is more than a mere sense impression of a human gestalt, namely, the inherent dimension of mind and feeling.²⁴ That is the one thing. But the moment of transparent transformation from sensory perception to consideration of another's soul-life, which occurs exclusively in interpersonal interaction, does not only relativise sensory perception as my main means of appropriately apprehending the gestalt I am meeting. Rather, on the level of soul perception it precipitates a further “extinguishing”, likewise in the form of a feeling of moral compulsion. This second level of withdrawal in the process of interpersonal interaction should – over and above the sensory appearance and feeling-life - be concerned with apprehending the actual thinking of the counterpart Self (“I”). The presence of the other person before me extinguishes the mere sense appearance, and what this presence

“reveals through this extinguishing compels me as a thinking being to extinguish my own thinking as long as I am under its influence, and to put its thinking in the place of mine” (ibid. p.260).

24. In saying, in 1918, that the “grasping of the other in thinking” involves approaching him via sensory perception as a being endowed with mind and feeling, Steiner gave this problem a specifically appellative formulation. This notably corresponds to what he says in chapter IX of *The Philosophy of Freedom* about the human being's fundamentally *moral* relationship to the world. Here we find: “From every occurrence which I perceive and which concerns me, there springs at the same time a moral duty”. In addition to the natural laws behind things and events “there is also”, as Steiner expresses it, “a moral label attached to them which for me, as a moral person, gives ethical directions as to how I have to conduct myself” (SKA 2, p.182). Quite apart from the question of whether the apprehension of this duty arises from ethical convention or moral intuition, in other words, either from tradition or from independent thinking, it would seem that for Steiner sensory perception is equally susceptible to having natural laws or moral ideas derived from it. From the point of view of interpersonal dynamics this implies that the human gestalt, as such, has “a moral label”, appellative-ethical in character, “attached to it”. To realise and acknowledge this is the task of interpersonal interaction. Fichte expressed this state of affairs in the theologically heightened sentence: “For the human being the human gestalt is necessarily sacred” (SW III, p.85).

Already in 1894 Steiner had formulated this *Epoché* of Self-oriented thinking within the context of interpersonal interaction as an appeal to “cease call[ing] to our aid any concepts at all of our own making”, and he made this restraint the *conditio sine qua non* of interpersonal understanding (“if we *would understand* [the other person] in his essence”) (SKA 2, p.238).

With the “extinguishing” of the sensory schema, and the alternating mutual “extinguishing” of the thinking of those involved, the ground is prepared for interpersonal interaction to occur as a qualitatively singular experience. This “threshold” may be construed as the transition Steiner had in mind when he wrote in his 1894 letter to Eduard von Hartmann:

“Where the concepts of space and time cease to have meaning, however, as in the sphere of ethics, that is where it also becomes impossible to speak of the *numerically different* [i.e. of separate individuals]” (GA 39, p.226).

In 1918 this transition is referred to in similar terms: “Through the self-extinction of the sense appearance” – this, of course, also has to do with the extinguishing of [my own] thinking, which was mentioned in the previous sentence – “the separation between the two spheres of consciousness is actually overcome” (SKA 2, p.252).²⁵

The implications for the theory of interpersonal dynamics of what we have come to so far may be summed up as follows: The other person, insofar as he “places himself before me” in a spirit of genuine meeting, initiates – in contrast to every other kind of confrontation with an object – a unique field of experience: that of real meeting between human beings. What is involved in this field comes to light initially through perception permeated with feeling, which reveals, in this interaction with the other person, something more than merely sensory, and through the Self’s “willingness to understand”. This willingness also has a quality of feeling or inner experience, namely that of the “moral imperative” to hold back on any spontaneous interpretation and judgment of the situation. Only with such openness in the field of experience are the conditions fulfilled, which understanding, as interpersonal experience and as the joint or reciprocal action of free individuals subsequent to understanding-based interaction, makes possible.

4.4 Shared consciousness

Having opened up the field of interpersonal dynamics, Steiner goes on to describe the act of meeting between free individuals, in other words their experiencing of the content of one another’s consciousness.

In 1894 Steiner had approached the experience of interpersonal interaction by speaking of it in terms of the other person *saying* (“*communicating*”) something about his “way of looking at the world” or about “the content of his will” (SKA 2, p.238). And the understanding of this communication was predicated upon “taking over ... those concepts by which he [the free individual] determines himself”, together with the withholding of our own concepts and judgments about what has been communicated. The first Appendix of the new edition of *The Philosophy of Freedom* explains this event as “the extinguishing of my thinking for the duration” of the communication. The analysis of this situation is then intensified and deepened in 1918 by the addition of two further aspects. My Self’s reception of the communication of the other person into the open space (emptiness) created by the extinguishing of its own thinking (concepts) makes it possible for the “other person’s” thinking to be experienced “as if it were my own experience” and to put *their* thinking in place of my own (SKA 2, pp.252). The result of the reception of the content of the one consciousness by the

25. In 1923 Albert Schweitzer’s main philosophical work, *Culture and Ethics*, was published. Here the subsequent winner of the Nobel Peace Prize develops, in the central 11th chapter, “The Ethics of Reverence for Life”, the idea of an “ethics of resignation” (ibid., pp.244-246). As regards the individual, the central concepts here are “inner freedom”, “being free of the world”, “being true to myself”, and as regards one’s fellows: “not judging others”, respect for another’s life” and the “interdependence of self-assertion and respect for another’s existence” (ibid.). For Schweitzer also the central thing about his principle of “reverence for life” is the dimension of individual experience within the context of living things. It would seem that in terms of the history of science – probably reinforced by the war experience – it was part of the current of the times to distance oneself from speculative world-pictures and ideologies and turn towards the existential nature of real human beings. That which in the middle and towards the end of the 19th century could still present itself, in a philosophical and literary manner, as individualism in the work of Stirner and Nietzsche became concentrated at the turn and early part of the 20th century with Steiner and Schweitzer upon the question of how to conduct a responsible individual life under the principle of “personalism” (cf. Heidegger 1927, pp.114-117).

other effectively abolishes their separation as atomised individuals completely closed off from one another: the solution, in other words, to Hartmann's atomism or solipsism problem. "The separation between the two spheres of consciousness is actually overcome" (ibid.). If in this way something communicated by one person replaces the conscious contents of another, then the one can be said to (temporarily) constitute the consciousness of the other, and not as a sense impression, but as a real experience of an individual spirit, as a person.

Steiner compares this experience to that of the alternation between waking and dream consciousness, both of which are real experiences within the realm of consciousness. It is questionable whether this analogy holds. Comparing the contents of another's consciousness to the dream state awakens associations with the unreal, which is surely not the intention. What is helpful about this analogy, however, is the fact that it refers to states which are experienced by *one* consciousness as real, and that in the case of the dream experience the "waking experience is extinguished".

Thus, in relating back to the fact of "the extinguishing of [one's own] thinking" and the "taking over of the other person's thinking" into one's own consciousness, the same intensity is ascribed to the conscious contents of the other person as to analogous dream images in connection with 'extinguished' waking consciousness. Except that

"in perceiving the other person, [...] the extinction of the content of one's own consciousness gives place not to unconsciousness, as it does in sleep, but to the content of the other person's consciousness" (SKA 2, p.253).²⁶

According to Steiner, the reason why we are not normally aware of such an immanent feature of consciousness as this alternation between the extinguishing of our own thinking, the taking over of another's, and the 'lighting up again' of our own is that these varying states of mind

"follow one another too quickly to be generally noticed" (ibid.).²⁷

On the theme of interpersonal dynamics this is as far as *The Philosophy of Freedom* goes. Nonetheless, Steiner subsequently came back to it once more in taking issue with von Hartmann's criticism, as published "in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; Vol.108, pp.55ff." (1896) (SKA 2, pp.255f.) Furthermore, in part three of *The Philosophy of Freedom*, in the chapter entitled "Ultimate Questions", Steiner sounds out the spiritual context within which interaction and communication between free individuals occurs. We have dealt with this subject elsewhere under the heading "Synthesis der Geisterwelt" (see Traub 2011, pp.868-875).

4.5 Steiner's issue with Eduard von Hartmann – experience versus speculation²⁸

Eduard von Hartmann, in the essay referred to by Steiner, constructs a situation involving two people in a room. What concerns Hartmann primarily here is the relationship between the given reality and the mental pictures each person has of the situation – in other words, the epistemological question as to the degree of realism or idealism in play in their view of the situation.

26. The reason Steiner worked with the distinction between dream- and waking-consciousness in connection with explaining the alternation between I-thinking and Thou-thinking in 1918 may be that in his writing of "*Occult Science*" in 1909 he explored the states of dreaming and waking very intensively. Cf. the chapter "Sleep and death" in: Steiner GA 13, pp.80-136.

27. Besides the somewhat problematical comparison of interpersonal interaction with the alternation between waking and dream consciousness there is another question which is not being addressed here; namely, whether this last contention about the rapid and, above all, *unremarked* alternation of states of consciousness represents a contradiction of Steiner's previous argumentation. Here we had both the *awareness* of the original individuality of the other person and the holding back and extinguishing of the protagonist's own thinking portrayed as *conscious acts*; or, at any rate, the impression given that what we had here were conscious, controlled – and therefore ethically relevant – *acts of freedom* and not Hartmannian unconscious processes.

28. In the field of Steiner research the relationship between E. von Hartmann and Rudolf Steiner has still to be investigated in any systematic detail. On the extremely strong influence of Hartmann on Steiner's theory of knowledge and moral philosophy, on his exploration of the theme of dream and the subconscious, see relevant passages in: H. Traub (2011). Recently Eckart Förster has drawn attention to the many-layered and ambivalent relationship between the two thinkers in his "Introduction" to SKA 2, pp.LXII-LXVII. On the Steiner-Hartmann relationship see also: Thomas Kracht: "*Philosophieren der Freiheit*" in Karl-Martin Dietz (ed.): *Rudolf Steiners Philosophie der Freiheit. Eine Menschenkunde des höheren Selbst*, Stuttgart 1994, pp.192f. The following considerations illuminate a specific, albeit fundamental dissension in the discussion between Steiner and Hartmann.

“When two persons are alone together in a room, *how many examples of these persons are present?* Whoever answers, “two”, is a naïve realist; whoever answers, “four (namely, in each person’s consciousness a Self and another)”, is a transcendental idealist; but he who answers, “six (namely, two persons as things-in-themselves and four mental pictures of persons, two in each of their minds)”, is a transcendental realist. Anyone wishing to construe any of these three different standpoints epistemologically as monism would have to give [...] a different answer [to this question]; but I have no idea what it would be.”²⁹

Steiner addresses this problem in two ways. Firstly, he outlines his model of interpersonal interaction once more in the light of Hartmann’s epistemological alternatives. Secondly, he expresses his disappointment at Hartmann’s fundamental misunderstanding of the experience-oriented approach he had put forward in *The Philosophy of Freedom*. It was evidently not a matter of indifference to Steiner, that this once so “highly-esteemed doctor” and respected teacher (Steiner. 1987, pp.148f.), to whom he dedicated the publication of his dissertation in 1882 “in warm admiration”, could so completely misunderstand him and even make public his critical “dig” at Steiner’s monism.

The detailed reiteration of the epistemological problem advanced by Hartmann on the subject of interpersonal interaction underlines once more how important the empirical approach to human interaction – considered previously – was for Steiner. He begins by confirming his fundamentally realist approach with the contention that: when two people are in a room together there are two people in the room. That is tautological. Nevertheless, these two persons, it is additionally assumed, each have constructed images in their minds, both of themselves (self-image) and of the gestalt of the other person. This, according to Hartmann, would be the point of view of ‘transcendental realism’. The mental pictures, however – and this is now the remarkable advance in Steiner’s thinking on interpersonal dynamics – are only “unreal perceptual images” (SKA 2, p.255). They are unreal – this follows from Steiner’s theory of knowledge and truth – because they (at this stage) lack the empirically mediated complement of the conceptual or ideal, which alone can render them worthy of being described as *real* mental pictures. In pursuance of this line of thinking on the interpersonal, therefore, the level of *pictorial* representation of the other person is followed by the level of *cognitive* apprehension of the four perceptual images by each person, and out of this alone can the *real* relationship to each other of these two people develop. In “the thinking activity of the two people, reality is grasped” (ibid.). According to Steiner, then, the reality of personal identity in the social context is not established by the perceived presence of the people involved and the mental images formed thereof, but *is generated* through the process of spiritual engagement with a personal counterpart, with a Thou.³⁰ This engagement follows according to the previously described schema, especially its third level – namely, that of each person’s permitting their reciprocal communications to “come to life” in each other’s consciousness.

This is the point the argument has come to so far. In keeping with how it unfolds the motif of the periodic extinguishing of thinking should now come to the fore. At this point in the first appendix, however, Steiner skips over this, and instead discusses in more detail the dialogical aspect of the “lighting up” or “coming to life” of both “spheres of consciousness”, i.e. the minds of each of the people involved. This more or less corresponds to the “rapid alternation” between one’s own thinking and the taking up of the other person’s thinking, which was spoken of previously. In this dynamic, reciprocal exchange of Self- and not-Self-content, in other words, in “these moments of coming to life”, the people involved – and this could be regarded as a fourth level – are no longer “enclosed within their own minds”, but each mind “overlaps” the other (ibid.). In the reflective phase of the process, when each one returns to their own mental picture, the cognitive experience of the presence of the other person remains in each of their minds, with the result (the fifth level) that “the consciousness of each person, in the experience of thinking, apprehends both himself and the other” (ibid.) – or comprehends or, as it was previously expressed, understands.

It is no surprise that Steiner found the epistemological and abstract model-making exercise of his esteemed teacher, Eduard von Hartmann, somewhat unsavoury in comparison to his own attempt at a true-life reconstruction of an I-Thou experience. Accordingly, he sums up Hartmann’s game of logic as follows:

29. E. v. Hartmann, quoted by R. Steiner, SKA 2, p.254f.

30. Whether this thought can be construed as an anticipation of G. H. Mead’s symbolic-interactionist theory of identity formation is simply noted here as a question, but will not be pursued in what follows. Cf. G. H. Mead 1968, pp.207ff.

“The transcendental realist [E. v. Hartmann] will have nothing whatever to do with the true state of affairs regarding the process of knowledge; he cuts himself off from the facts by a tissue of thoughts and entangles himself in it”. (SKA 2, p.255).

The whole point of what Steiner was trying to say in his experience-oriented analysis of (among other things) interpersonal interaction was, it seemed to him, “ignored by Eduard von Hartmann” (ibid.). This impression of fundamental misunderstanding on Hartmann's part was later confirmed for Steiner in Hartmann's letter of 13th June, 1897, to which Steiner briefly refers at the end of the *First Appendix* of 1918. Here again Hartmann is only concerned with schematic classifications of theses in relation to epistemological models within the dynamic of idealism versus realism, on the one hand, and subjectivity and objectivity on the other. Here, to finish, we will briefly consider this.

In this letter von Hartmann contends that it is impossible for the content of the moral intuitions of particular individuals to be “numerically identical” to the objectivity of a trans-subjective idea.

“Subjective-ideal being as conscious content and consciousness-transcending being cannot be predicated of the same grammatical subject at the same time.’ Whoever regards this sentence in this form as invalid, him I must subsume, *insofar* as he regards it as invalid, under the heading of naïve realism” (Steiner, 1987, p.358).

Apparently Steiner had failed to solve the problem of combining universalism and particularism, but since Hartmann's counter-argument in this connection was rather weak, Steiner did not take the bait. Rather, he countered by saying he knew

“that a transcendental realist describes this [Steiner's position] as a relapse into naïve realism.”

But then, in *The Philosophy of Freedom* he had

“already pointed out that naïve realism retains its justification *for the thinking that is experienced*” (SKA 2, p.255, italics mine).

Thus Steiner re-emphasises his interest in an experience-oriented, real-life approach to this theme. His argument for the combining of subjective intuition and the objective reality of ideas from the perspective of interpersonal interaction was given particular attention in the final chapter of *The Philosophy of Freedom*: “Ultimate questions – the consequences of monism”. And here he offers a solution to the problem assumed by Hartmann to be insoluble, namely that of identity between subjective intuition and objective idea “in the same numerical subject”. He does this, however, not in terms of formal, but of transcendental logic, or, as Steiner would no doubt prefer to say, spiritually real logic. The argument runs as follows:

The “conceptual content of the world is the same for all human individuals.³¹ [...] According to monistic principles, one human individual regards another as akin to himself because the same world content expresses itself in him. [...] Thinking leads all perceiving subjects to the same ideal unity in all multiplicity. [...] The ideas of another human being are in substance mine also, and I regard them as different only as long as I *perceive*, but no longer when I *think*. Every human being embraces in his thinking only a part of the total world of ideas, and to that extent individuals differ even in the actual content of their thinking. But all these contents are within a self-contained whole, which embraces the thought contents of all human beings” (SKA 2, p.246; italics mine).

That which sounds like a rarified, metaphysical speculation on the *a priori* conditions for the possibility of interpersonal interaction and communication is, however, intended by Steiner as a causally real field of human interpersonal experience, as a world of successful communication and interaction between free spirits “with the foundation of its existence within itself”, as the “universal primordial Being which pervades all men” (ibid., p.246), and which can bring about real meeting between human beings at any time.

31. With reference to the propositions of formal science, say, of logic, this thesis is self-evident. That Steiner advances this congruence also as the basis for moral and aesthetic thought characterises his philosophy as Realism (as opposed to Nominalism). In terms of the history of philosophy this idea stretches over Schelling's and Fichte's idealist realism back to Plato's doctrine of Ideas. With regard to all of which Steiner always took a critical stance – entirely in keeping with Fichte's “genetic method” – in relation to the strict Realism of “ideas as real-in-themselves”.

5. Summary and outlook

Steiner's *Philosophy of Freedom* does not deal with the theme of interpersonal dynamics as such. Indeed, for critics of anthroposophy it is questionable whether the dimension of the interpersonal can be said to have any kind of a role in the philosophy and anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner, given the primacy accorded therein to individual self-realisation. We have, however, shown here that already in 1894 Steiner had tackled the problem of the harmonising of different individuals' ideas of freedom in several passages of the first edition of *The Philosophy of Freedom*. The account of this problem develops naturally out of the dynamic between the ethical individualism of Steiner's approach to moral philosophy, which has a tendency to pluralism, and the epistemology of monism, which forms the basis of his philosophy as a whole. This, it seems, was clear to Steiner, which is likely why he put forward the relevant considerations on the problem of interpersonal dynamics just mentioned. Even from the relatively few discussions on this from 1894, aspects of a working, if not yet clearly structured, idea are discernible as the basic features of a noteworthy conception of interpersonal interaction. Steiner's awareness of this subject was then brought into much sharper relief by Eduard von Hartmann's charge of solipsism. The result was that in the First Appendix to the second edition of *The Philosophy of Freedom* in 1918 he quite explicitly took up this issue again. Extracted from their respective contexts, and focused upon a systematic concept of interpersonal dynamics, a six-step model of interpersonal interaction – of relevance to moral philosophy – can be reconstructed from Steiner's various remarks on the subject.

1. The first step is marked by *meeting a human being* as something fundamentally distinct from relating to an object. In seeking to gain knowledge of an object, the Self must actively investigate and discover the concepts and laws of its structure, whereas in human interaction the other person himself makes known the condition of his mind and will, thereby placing the Self in more of a passive role. In human interaction Steiner's concern is more with the quality of the actual experience two people have in meeting one another, and less with a theoretical analysis of the situation.
2. The second step – *extinguishing of the sensory* – accentuates the spiritual dimension of human meeting as opposed to the purely physical encounter of moving configurations of people in a room. Certain considerations from *Occult Science*, although from a different context, can be understood as a continuation of this idea of the “extinguishing of the sensory” in the context of interpersonal interactions – and in two different ways. Therein are described, on the one hand, the element of the “elevation” of the Self in the transcending of the sensory, and on the other the associated idea of “spiritual enjoyment” (Steiner, 2013, p.103). The “sense world”, as he says, “is a manifestation of the spirit hidden behind it. The Self would never be able to enjoy the spirit in the form in which it is able to manifest through bodily senses alone, did it not want to use these senses for the enjoyment of the spiritual within the sense world” (ibid.). As an example of this enjoyable spiritual “elevation” of the Self through knowledge of the spiritual in the sense-world Steiner then introduces the I-Thou relationship in the form of a love relationship. “A person who loves another is certainly not attracted only to that in him which can be experienced through the physical organs. [...] Just that part [withheld from perception] of the loved one then becomes [through the extinguishing of the sensory] visible for the [super-sensible] perception of which the physical organs were only the means” (ibid., 104). This implies that the idea of the “extinguishing of the sensory” occurring when two people meet, as presented in *The Philosophy of Freedom*, also opens up the sphere of “spiritual enjoyment” in the positive sense, and at the same time, it may be assumed, enables them to experience the “elevation” of each other's Self.
3. If the last step has been reciprocal in that the individuals involved have recognised one another as free spirits, then the groundwork has been prepared for the third step – *communication and participation*.
4. To be successful this third step in a process of interpersonal interaction requires, as a fourth step, the *desire to understand*, which Steiner designates as a readiness on each person's part to take on what is being communicated by the other Self as their own thinking, or at least to receive it temporarily as such.

5. And this in turn entails a fifth step, which is the intermittent *extinguishing of one's own thinking*, in other words, the reception of what is being communicated by the other person without 'mixing in one's own conceptual content'.
6. The diversity of such interactions between human individuals possible at any time is now, in a sixth step, harmonised. In keeping with the epistemology of monism, this effectively means that, with sufficient clarification *in thinking*, it must be possible for the diverse individual ideas to be referred back to a common ideal foundation. Out of this, then, both freedom from contradiction in argumentation and the possibility of consensus-based action would arise. For steps four, five and six we can also add in the aspects of "spiritual enjoyment" and the "elevation" of the Self, which were mentioned above under point two, in connection with the "extinguishing of the sensory".

The echoes here in Steiner of classical solutions to the question of the intellectual or ethical harmonisation of a plurality of individualised minds – the idea, say, of a 'pre-established harmony', that of a 'synthesis of the world of mind' or that of an *a priori* community of communication – cannot, however, be permitted to blot out the striking distinctness of Steiner's experience-oriented approach. For this is not arrived at deductively on the theoretical assumption of such a principle, but inductively, through its generation by actual individuals in the realisation of an authentic interpersonal interaction.

From a systematic point of view, however, we must point out that there is a gap in Steiner's model of interpersonal dynamics. In his interpretation of this Herbert Witzmann went some way towards repairing it, albeit not systematically. In his essay "Das Erwachen am anderen Menschen" (a quotation from Steiner) Witzmann discusses extracts from Steiner's *Dornach Lectures* (Steiner 1965), which stress the importance of the relationship to other people for the whole development of the Self and for the furtherance of communication and interaction, particularly among anthroposophists (Witzmann 1985a, pp.38-54). In the text quoted by Witzmann, Steiner very briefly goes over the relevant elements of his ideas on interpersonal dynamics, as are familiar to us from *The Philosophy of Freedom*. Apart from "the need to remember one's spiritual home", there exists, as is stated in the Dornach lecture,

"the other need to allow oneself to be inwardly awakened through the presence of another person. And the impulse of feeling [!] active here – this is the new idealism. When the Ideal ceases to be a mere abstraction, if it is to take root once more in the life of the human spirit, then it will take the form of: *I will awaken to the presence of the other person*".

And he goes on more specifically:

"that can be what is special about the way the community life of the anthroposophical society is conducted, and can establish itself quite naturally" (Steiner, quot. in Witzmann, 1985a, p.39).

What Steiner explains here in this lecture is more or less what he said about interpersonal dynamics within the context of *The Philosophy of Freedom*, with which we are already familiar. Noteworthy is the fact that here he once more accentuates the impulsive dimension of feeling in interpersonal interaction. Furthermore, his specifying this situation as the "new idealism" is a clear indication of his adherence to the tradition of classical German philosophy, whereby he also stresses, as a (presumed) further development of this, the empirical-personal, one could also say, existential-pragmatic or ethical dimension of "communal growth through one another". Herbert Witzmann's commentary on the meaning of this Steiner quotation, while being very frankly esoteric, finally makes clear reference to *The Philosophy of Freedom*, when he sums up with: we may be able to glimpse the

"ultimate source of a modern, spiritually authentic way of building a community or a society through observation of the inner impulses of others, in the sense put forward in *The Philosophy of Freedom*" (ibid., p.51).

Thus Witzmann underlines the fundamental importance of *The Philosophy of Freedom* also for providing answers to issues arising from his own ideas on interpersonal dynamics. Witzmann then expounds in more detail the connection between human meeting – the 'awakening to the presence of the other person' – and the interchange occurring between those involved through their participation in the universal, super-sensible world of ideas. In such a meeting, he says, two things are happening – namely, "community-building from

above”, in other words, the descending “coming into presence of higher spiritual beings” (Steiner’s Christ-Jesus motif, cf. Steiner, 2013, p.294), and a complementary, ascending “community-building from below”. The latter is the initiating and pursuance of the interpersonal “awakening to the presence of the other person”, in other words, the establishing of an (anthroposophical?) “knowledge community” (Witzenmann, 1985a, p.52). The “awakening to the presence of the other person” Witzenmann calls the “minor ontic exchange”. The interchange between the “knowledge communities” and the “higher spiritual beings” he calls the “major ontic exchange”, and describes it as “outshining” the minor one (ibid.). This construction of a horizontal, but ascending ‘minor community-making’ and a vertical, but descending ‘major community-making’ can very clearly be construed as a terminological variation on the themes of interpersonal dynamics and the mediation between individualism and universalism, as found in Steiner’s *Philosophy of Freedom*. What is missing from this construction, however – and this is explained by the source from which it was developed – is, to say it in Witzenmann’s anthroposophical language, a closer description or definition of the “spiritual being” that forms itself out of this community-making in this process of ‘awakening to the presence of the other person’. Witzenmann’s idea of the awakening of “I-beings” in the ‘minor ontic exchange’, and of the ‘interpenetration’ of the individual and the universal “I” (Self) in the ‘major ontic exchange’ remains conceptually caught in the form of “I-relatedness”, and consequently delivers no qualitative, spiritual gain from the sphere of interpersonal interaction. I and Thou remain, from the transcendental perspective, “I’s”, even though each other’s thought content can overlap in the world of ideas they have in common.

“I am I only for myself; for everyone else I am a Thou; and for me everyone else is a Thou.’ This fact is the outward expression of a profound truth”,

says Steiner in *Occult Science* (Steiner, 2013, p.66), thereby confirming the impression that interpersonal interaction as such does not, as it is constituted in itself, represent any kind of spiritual gain. In the act of meeting only mutually “awakening” “I’s” attain higher development.

For Witzenmann, however, this is not the last word on this matter. For in his essay “Die Schülerschaft im Zeichen des Rosenkreuzes” (Witzenmann, 1985b, pp.141-151) he speaks of the “spiritual being” that arises out of the interchange between two individuals in a process of interpersonal interaction. What is to be noted about this idea is – and this links up with Steiner’s “new idealism” thesis – that it has to do with a central category in the thinking of J. G. Fichte, a category which the latter put forward in a chapter of *Wissenschaftslehre* with which Steiner may well have been familiar. It concerns the concept of “we”, and not in a grammatical or linguistic sense, but in its philosophical, interpersonal-constitutive and qualitative meaning. According to Urs Richli in “Das Wir in der späten Wissenschaftslehre”, Fichte uses the concept *We* to designate a trans-individual subject, which by means of “common consent has been fused into a consensual unity”. Fundamental for this ‘fusion into a consensual unity’ is an “intersubjective experience of supporting evidence”, which, according to Fichte, occurs particularly through collective acts of cognition (Richli, 1997, p.360).³² The kinship of this thought to Steiner’s 1894 conception of a process of interpersonal interaction involving the reciprocal reception of individual thought-content, resulting in the complete congruence of both spheres of consciousness is certainly remarkable. Except that in Steiner’s *Philosophy of Freedom* the consciousness of *We* brought about by this experience is not systematically reflected upon. In Witzenmann’s above-mentioned essay, however, the situation is different. It is true that the basic spiritual experience of “awakening to the presence of the other person” also features here. Nevertheless, the thought is now taken further in the direction of the “We-experience”, which is brought about by the I-Thou relationship. Witzenmann has no doubt that with this experience we have a new dimension of community life brought about by this relationship. “For the state of unity, which expresses itself [for the Self] in the Thou-experience, enables something supra-human to be present, which towers over I and Thou” (ibid., p.145). And taking as given the already familiar idea of the “minor” and “major ontic exchange”, he says: “the [reciprocal] Thou-experience becomes the vehicle of the We-experience” (ibid.).³³ According to Witzenmann, this “We-

32. Cf. also Traub (2011), pp.89-92.

33. We have already referred to the “brotherhood motif” in *Occult Science*, for which Steiner gives a Christological justification. Here, however, it remains open, whether Steiner there was actually aware of the systematic significance of this thought for his idea of interpersonal dynamics, and whether he clearly recognised the qualitative and systematic progress it provided for interpersonal interaction. For the biblical verse with which he illustrates at this point the experience-oriented and individualised “synthesis of the

experience” – in which the “awakening [of the Self] in the presence of another person and the “minor ontic exchange” of the “knowledge communities” all converge and interpenetrate with the “major ontic exchange”, the ‘coming to presence of higher spiritual beings – is the “archetypally human” (ibid.).

With the idea of We a line can reasonably be drawn under Steiner's model of interpersonal dynamics, also the version of it enlarged by various anthroposophical considerations. These considerations were added to by Witzmann, but also by Steiner before him. Either that, or they already implied ideas on a community of practice which goes beyond communities of thought and knowledge. Either way, they are consistent with conclusions which go beyond the six-step model of interpersonal interaction in their organisational structures and practical consequences, but not in their ideational basis. For if Steiner's six-step model is understood as an idea according to which, as stated in *The Philosophy of Freedom*, fully realised human interaction occurs, then substantial guidelines – in keeping with Steiner's philosophy and anthroposophy – for the organisation of any kind of interpersonal interaction and communication processes can be derived from it. This means, it is a model that, over and above its value as an ideal form, would have something significant and exemplary to say especially in fields of practical anthroposophical application, such as educational science and medicine, indeed all those areas of anthroposophical practice where interpersonal communication and interaction are central. But Steiner's model is not only useful in stimulating and giving direction to philosophical and anthroposophical thinking and action. For that which was originally conceived – in a somewhat elitist manner – as a post-conventionalist communication idea for free spirits (i.e. those capable of moral imagination), can – used democratically – be extended in its application in all sorts of ways, and become a guideline for a humane culture of communication for society in general, for all levels of communication and for all shades of public discourse participants. Our public conversations nowadays are light on the universal; instead they are dominated by particular and individual interests, sometimes extremely heated, with little interest in wanting to understand or self-critically take on board the other's thinking. The model is an approach that would do this debate (non-) culture – both inside and outside social media – a lot of good.

world of mind” through the super-sensible Christ-ideal, namely: “I and the Father are one”, does not lead into a higher category of community-building and of the We, but adheres strictly to I-thinking, to “the name of Christ” as “ultimate foundation” of the “human I” (cf. Steiner, 2013, p.294).

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Herbert Witzenmann's Path to the Philosophical Sources of Anthroposophy

Part I

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ABSTRACT. This article is the written version of a lecture given in December 2017 at Alanus University as a contribution to the lecture series “The Philosophical Sources of Anthroposophy”. It pursues Herbert Witzenmann’s (1905-1988) struggle for the philosophical originality of Anthroposophy in the fields of tension and development of his biography and tries to show how this can be found in the relationship of individual appropriation movements to universal meaning structures. This core principle of Anthroposophy, described by Witzenmann himself as the basic structure, is outlined in exemplary aspects of his conscious development and his literary and artistic expression, especially in Witzenmann’s school and university education, his work in the family business, his commitment to the Anthroposophical society and his endeavour to make Anthroposophy connectable to academic forms of science. With his explanation of the double-sided, methodological and structural-logical source point of Anthroposophy, Witzenmann stands productively within Steiner’s unfinished work and at the same time points beyond its current manifestations – and encourages its further development.

Keywords: Husserl, Jaspers, basic structure, egomorphosis, scientific elaboration of Anthroposophy

1. Introduction

In researching the philosophical sources of anthroposophy, it might seem strange at first glance to be speaking about an individual who was not a philosopher in the usual sense, and was neither a precursor nor a contemporary of Rudolf Steiner. This apparent confusion could, however, prompt us to turn the source metaphor around upon itself and inquire not only into the sources in the sense of external ‘origins’ in particular philosophers or schools of thought which ostensibly influenced Rudolf Steiner (*genitivus objectivus*), but into anthroposophy itself as a ‘spring’ feeding streams which took on philosophical and other forms (*genitivus subjectivus*). The question is whether, as various authors have suggested (Zander, 2007; Traub, 2011), Steiner’s anthroposophy can to any extent be regarded as simply the sum of its presumed parts; or whether as a whole it is more than the sum of all its verifiable points of reference within the history of philosophy – whether, in other words, it has a philosophical core of its own. Turning the metaphor around as suggested only makes sense in the latter case, for only from this perspective could anthroposophy be seen as having the requisite inherent potential to go beyond and further develop those philosophical territories staked out by Steiner’s precursors and contemporaries, and possibly even by Steiner himself. In the former case, simply providing a referenced account of its philosophical components would be sufficient to explain anthroposophy – rather like the contributions of Christianity, Plato and Aristotle to medieval scholasticism – and would rob it of any possibility of philosophical originality.

The struggle to identify the specific philosophical character of anthroposophy and to give it clear scientific expression may be regarded as the leitmotif of Herbert Witzmann's life. 'Character', in turn, can be construed both from a universal and an individual perspective. Consequently Witzmann sees anthroposophy not only as an objectively founded system which remains, as far as possible, impersonal, absolute and abstract, but more particularly as a path of individual development, through which its character – in comparison to other schools of philosophy – really only begins to be fully and appropriately realised. That there need be no contradiction in the polarity between individual expression and the affirmation of trans-subjectivity, neither in an artistic nor a scientific sense, is shown by Witzmann's biography, which can be read as an exploration into anthroposophy, carried on through succeeding stages of maturity, and a quest to find its appropriate modern modes of expression. Accordingly, this article is not only an account of Witzmann's philosophical works and their relationship to anthroposophy, but also brings in certain biographical landmarks which illuminate the central aspects of his interpretation of anthroposophy and how it relates to his own personal achievements. Viewed in this way neither anthroposophy nor, for that matter, science can remain as they are, or as they are generally thought to be, but will be in continual development in accordance with that of the individual minds engaged in them. This genetic, process-centred approach in no way negates the logical core or intellectual principles of scientific method, but it makes clear that the constituents of this core – as in the case of anthroposophy – may depend on how it has been progressively expressed, and that it can therefore only gradually take form through the actions of individual practitioners and the insights they have acquired.

2. Biographical development

At this point, then, some details of Herbert Witzmann's biography will be presented, insofar as they are relevant to the exposition (Hartmann, 2010; Witzmann, 1985). He was born in 1905 into a family of inventors and manufacturers, and grew up in Pforzheim. Here his grandfather had, in 1889, invented the flexible metal hose and founded a factory which underwent constant expansion, and which he handed on to Herbert Witzmann's father and brothers. Witzmann's early childhood experience was full of contrast. On the one hand, he was already accompanying his father on the factory floor at the age of three, and there he spent a lot of time among the work-benches, made friends with the workers, and received his first impressions of industrial manufacturing processes. On the other hand, his own words tell how he experienced paranormal states of consciousness, in which he felt himself to be in flowing harmony with the world, and which he attempted to cultivate further in his later childhood and youth, especially through an activity he dearly loved – playing the piano. By the age of four, from being read fairy tales by his grandfather, Witzmann had taught himself to read. From that time on reading and writing became increasingly important to him. His first literary attempts were written down for him by his father. At five he started having piano lessons. Schooling having begun with teachers at home, he subsequently attended primary school, and at the age of nine entered a non-denominational grammar school. The quality of the teaching he there encountered was rather poor by today's standards, and as a result Witzmann's highly intelligent and artistically sensitive nature was plunged into an initial crisis. When he was 14 or 15 he started, together with some of his schoolmates, an "alliance against intellectualism". The idea was that they would articulate their protests by taking up contrary positions in their school assignments. However, "this brought him the first real experience of pain in his life, as the initially very enthusiastic members [...] found it easier to make compromises which contradicted the alliance's aims" (Witzmann, 1985, p. 109). This state of affairs is an early illustration of Witzmann's highly idealistic and at times seemingly uncompromising disposition, and would appear to anticipate the sort of confrontations he got into in later phases of his life.

His heartfelt aim to become a professional pianist and devote his life completely to the pursuit of his art was shattered by the discovery of an incurable weakness in the tendons of his arms. In his distress over this he appealed, in 1923, to Rudolf Steiner whom he had heard speak in the First Goetheanum in Dornach on one brief occasion. Rudolf Steiner's books, first and foremost "Knowledge of the Higher Worlds and its Attainment", were already familiar to him. In them he found that what he had long held to be certain from his own inner experience was expressed and taken further. It therefore seemed to him only natural to

ask Steiner for advice about this necessary change in the course of his studies. Steiner recommended him to pursue his special love of poetry and literature by taking a course on literature and art history. As things stood Witzenmann had already been studying piano at the College of Music in Stuttgart and “general science” at the Higher Institute of Technology. In the context of this latter course, which his father had urged him to do with an eye to his later participation in the family business, he attended physics lectures by Schrödinger and Heisenberg. Following Steiner’s advice, Witzenmann enrolled in autumn 1923 at the University of Munich to study philosophy and art history, but moved to the University of Basel the next year in order to be closer to Steiner and the anthroposophical movement in Dornach. The experience he had of Steiner at the educational conference in Stuttgart and the drama course in Dornach in 1924 made a lasting impression on the young man. Steiner recommended that he join in with the work of the Youth Section, but Witzenmann could not find it in himself to do so, since he felt that its activities lacked the methodological and epistemological quality he was looking for, and that it therefore offered him little chance of learning anything. After Steiner’s death in 1925 he left Switzerland and continued his studies in Freiburg, now focusing primarily on linguistics in addition to philosophy, art theory and musicology. Here he attended a number of lectures by Edmund Husserl, among others “Fundamental Problems of Logic” and “Nature and Mind”, as well as introductions to phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. If later on Witzenmann never explicitly referred to Husserl, he may well, nevertheless, have found these lectures very interesting and inspiring as examples of the form and content of an introspective, phenomenological method of research in philosophy. Indeed he did, at a later date, “while writing about [Steiner’s] theory of knowledge and spiritual science, follow up, in his own way, on a whole series of specific questions posed by Husserl” (Hartmann, 2010, p. 104), even though he rejected the notion of a pre-supposed reality and described the basic process of cognition in a different way to Husserl (Wagemann, 2010).

The fact that Witzenmann had no further experience of Husserl during his studies may have been due to the latter’s retirement in 1928. On the other hand, his own thinking was not entirely in tune with the philosophy of phenomenology, the reason being that ever since his school-days Witzenmann had pursued the idea of a “psycho-morphosis” (later “ego-morphosis”) of language: “The human Self – this I sensed in a dim sort of a way from very early on – is the ultimate power behind all acts of creativity. It sets the structural power of its formative seal upon all its productions. All human artefacts, and especially all productions of genuine art, bear the stamp of this Self, and language is a primal work of art structured by this power of the Self” (Witzenmann, 2005, p. 102). After the collapse of his dream of being a pianist he had concentrated his studies upon the aim of turning this idea into some kind of scientific treatise. In Freiburg he found in the linguist Hermann Ammann (1885-1956) a responsive listener, and potential dissertation supervisor. However, two characteristic factors of Witzenmann’s constitution combined in hindering the completion of this work: on the one hand, his delicate state of health kept holding him back, and on the other there was his “stubborn universalising tendency”, which caused the dissertation “to grow into a book encompassing my whole worldview” (after Hartmann, 2010, p. 114). Witzenmann became seriously ill and left Freiburg at the end of 1929 without a degree.

It took him the next three years to get better. Part of his convalescence he spent in Switzerland on a biodynamic farm, where he taught on an educational project for unemployed people. In 1930 he married the poet and singer, Maria Wozak, and in the same year also wrote some poems of considerable length as well as a drama. The real possibility opening up for him at the time of making his living as a professional author and poet was dashed, however, with the rise to power of the National Socialists. This meant that to have his works published in Germany he would have had to join the NS Artists Federation, which he categorically refused to do. During his time in Switzerland there had also been his growing friendship with Ernst Schenkel, who was working on a dissertation¹, and this led him to think of resuming his plans for his own dissertation. In 1933 Witzenmann enrolled in Heidelberg and approached Karl Jaspers with his intended plan. Jaspers suggested to him a more strictly philosophical topic: “The philosophy of work in Hegel and Nietzsche.” At first he was on very friendly terms with Jaspers, but the latter distanced himself once he became aware of Witzenmann’s fundamentally anthroposophical leanings. The volume submitted to Jaspers as a doctoral

1. Individuum und Gemeinschaft. Der demokratische Gedanke bei J. G. Fichte, 1933.

thesis in 1934 was rejected. In the period following this it seems Witzenmann was busy with the revision of the manuscript, but it remains unclear whether he simply did not manage to finish it, did not hand it in again, or whether it was once more rejected. At any rate, after the war an attempt on Witzenmann's part to re-awaken Jaspers' interest in his work also came to nothing.

It seemed to me necessary to present Witzenmann's early years in this fairly comprehensive way in order to show clearly how he was caught in the intellectual and spiritual tension between academia and anthroposophy. In 1937 a third stress-point, which hitherto had remained in the background, entered his life, when he became technical manager of the family firm, having studied engineering in Munich. Of the privations he and his family of, by now, four children suffered during the war, of the political danger they faced, and of the ultimate experience of the loss of all their belongings and the almost total destruction of the factory in Pforzheim, the full details will not here be given. Suffice it to say that in two bombing raids on Pforzheim all Witzenmann's material possessions, including all his literary and academic papers, were destroyed. In 1945, at the age of forty, he found himself faced, like many another in Germany, with the necessity of having to start from scratch. Since the firm was in process of being rebuilt it could only provide a living for one family (that of his brother) in the immediate aftermath of the war. Witzenmann, therefore, tried to find a position among his anthroposophical connections and worked for some time on the editorial staff of the magazine "Die Drei", and of the publishing house "Freies Geistesleben". He also became intensely involved in giving lectures and courses under the auspices of the Anthroposophical Society. For "Die Drei" he wrote numerous articles, among them "Intuition und Beobachtung" ("Intuition and Observation"), which presents his own concentrated and systematic account of Steiner's theory of knowledge, interpreted in terms of the phenomenology of consciousness. In 1951 Witzenmann resumed his position as the firm's technical manager. The years that followed were marked by an increasingly difficult juggling act between his work for the firm and his anthroposophical commitments, and by a protracted phase of illness. During this latter, in 1958, he wrote "Die Voraussetzungslosigkeit der Anthroposophie" ("The Unconditionality of Anthroposophy") as an introductory book for young people. Time and again Witzenmann would use such retreat phases due to illness for the purposes of writing. In 1963 he was nominated onto the executive council of the General Anthroposophical Society by Albert Steffen, whom Steiner had named as his successor. Witzenmann now needed to leave the firm, but it took four years of legal wrangles for him to finally do so. He found no longer being involved in the inventions and fortunes of the family business very painful.

In parallel with this, through his work on the executive council he found himself at the end of the sixties in the middle of a conflict situation which plunged him into an existential crisis. The background to this notorious episode, known as the "books dispute", needs to be outlined here, if Witzenmann's approach to anthroposophy is to be understood. After Steiner's death the publication rights to all his works were transferred to his wife, Marie Steiner. As she considered the then executive council of the Anthroposophical Society, and the Society as a whole, to be incapable of preserving and promoting Steiner's works in the manner they required, she set up an independent association to manage and publish his literary estate. To the members of the executive council at that time – also to Witzenmann – this seemed to stand in glaring contradiction to the spirit of the Christmas conference of 1923, where Steiner had brought about a merger between the anthroposophical movement and the Society, including the School of Spiritual Science (Goetheanum) (cf. Witzenmann, 1988b, p. 24f).² What it came down to, therefore, was a dispute over inheritance, provoked by separating the legal-economic (Estate Association) and the spiritual (Society and School) aspects of the situation, thus setting them against one another. In the controversies which continued over the succeeding decades Witzenmann made his position clear, fleshing out his arguments in full detail. He felt that it was the task of the Society and the School of Spiritual Science to have full responsibility for the organisation and further development of anthroposophy. To regard Steiner's work as finished until his presumed next incarnation, and to simply manage it in this spirit and publish it in book form, was deeply repugnant to him.

2. "Through the Christmas conference Rudolf Steiner accomplished two things: for the archetypal image of a school of esoteric teaching that every human being carries in the depths of their unconscious he provided a valid earthly manifestation in the form of an institution appropriate to our time; moreover, of this epochal, in other words, thoroughly modern impulse towards a School of Spiritual Science he made a principle of a community of practical knowledge" (Witzenmann, 1988b, p. 29).

The only solution he saw, therefore, would take the form of a consciousness raising exercise, both within the executive council, and between the council and the Estate Association, with a view to the latter's eventual re-integration into the School of Spiritual Science (the Society). Since, however, the Estate Association was more or less constrained, according to the statutes of its constitution, to deny the School of Spiritual Science its right to exist – at least in terms of its esoteric function – this path of action seemed to be a dead end. On the other hand, after the death of Albert Steffen voices were increasingly raised on the executive council and among the Society membership in favour of a compromise, which would permit Steiner's books to be offered for sale in the Goetheanum, thus enabling officially approved access to his works.

In 1968 opinion on the executive council finally shifted in favour of such a compromise – “the books resolution”, as it was called. This pushed Witzenmann, who stuck resolutely to his opinion, into the position of outsider. He felt betrayed by his colleagues on the council, but he continued to be completely committed to his place on the council and its associated duties and activities, regarding it as a life-long task. He therefore refused, at first, to leave his post at the Goetheanum (Witzenmann, 1988b, p. 25). Subsequently, however, his conditions of work were made very difficult, and he was removed from his position as leader of the Section for Social Science (1970) and of the Youth Section (1971). As a result of these events, from the early seventies on a number of initiatives either developed or began intensifying their work. These had either been started by Witzenmann himself or formed around his philosophical and anthroposophical work. Here may be mentioned: the working group “Beiträge zur Weltlage” (“Reports on the State of the World”), which had been running since 1962, the Alanus Foundation, founded by Betty Lipin in 1969, the “Seminar für Freie Jugendarbeit, Kunst und Sozialorganik” (“Seminar for Independent Youth Work, Art and the Social Organism”) started in 1973, and Gideon Spicker Press, founded by Henriette Jaquet in 1972, which has published the greater part of Witzenmann's books. In terms of his output of philosophical and anthroposophical works, Witzenmann's last 15 years may be regarded as his most productive. In addition to various collections of essays, he wrote the monographs “Vererbung und Wiederverkörperung des Geistes” (“Inheritance and Re-incarnation of the Spirit” 1972/1984), “Die Philosophie der Freiheit als Grundlage künstlerischen Schaffens” (“The Philosophy of Freedom as a Basis for Artistic Creation” 1980), “Strukturphänomenologie” (“Structural Phenomenology”, 1983) – developed from a series of lectures given at the Ruhr University in Bochum, and “Goethes universalästhetischer Impuls” (“Goethe's universal aesthetic impulse” 1987). Herbert Witzenmann died in Heidelberg in September 1988 at the age of 85.

3. Philosophical Works

3.1 *The Method of Introspective Observation*

Although Witzenmann's efforts to forge an academic career for himself came to an end with Jaspers' repeated rejection of his proposed dissertation, he did not lose interest in current developments in philosophy, psychology, art theory and sociology. Depending on the occasion and the target group, he took a more or less explicit stance on a variety of historical and contemporary currents of thought and individual thinkers, viewing these in relation to his main concern of providing a scientific account of anthroposophy. By this he did not mean the importing into anthroposophy of mainstream scientific methods, such as the collection and evaluation of statistical data and deductive argumentation (Hartmann, 2013, p. 151). Rather his purpose was to justify anthroposophy as a science in its own right by exemplifying and applying its core methodology in terms of the phenomenology of consciousness, and then on this basis to show its relationship to other approaches. Through his taking on single-handed responsibility for this systematic research – “introspective observation following the methods of natural science”, as Steiner called it (Steiner, 1918/1958) – he was putting the above-mentioned reversal of the “source metaphor” into practice: the source of knowledge is sought and found by the human individual through his systematic identification of the processes of his own consciousness. For anthroposophy this means replacing the kind of spirituality that looks up to authority and seeks only to preserve, expound, ritualise and institutionalise its activities (“top-down spirituality”), with one geared towards individual experience, initiative, and the power of personal expression and development (“bottom-up spirituality”, Witzenmann, 1987, p. 46f.). This emancipatory motif was already present in

Witzenmann's earlier schoolboy rebellion against the intellectualism that dominated cultural life then as it still did, and which he was attempting to transform through his anthroposophical and philosophical research and through his teaching.

In demonstrating the methodological consistency in Steiner's works, Witzmann was also placing them soundly within the context of the style of consciousness that arose at the time of the Scientific Revolution. For the principle of systematic thought combined with experimental observation, that in natural science is restricted in its application to the material world, only attains the full range of its cultural and creative capacity insofar as each person actively investigates and cultivates awareness of their participatory relationship to the world.³ Thus, just as many insights and abilities only accessible in former cultural epochs to a few initiates and sages are now a normal part of general education (e.g. reading, writing and mathematics), so the fundamental process of personal development through knowledge, which hitherto has only attained rudimentary expression in experimental science, can in future become a fully conscious cultural possession for everyone. Accordingly, Witzmann sees in Steiner's works the inevitable development of scientific consciousness into a "new spiritual principle of civilisation", the effects of which will permeate all areas of human life (Witzmann, 1988b, p. 25).

From an epistemological point of view, this methodological kinship between anthroposophy and natural science stands in marked contrast to Husserl's phenomenology, for he made a sharp critical distinction between his approach and all forms of positivist science (Husserl, 1970). Insofar as Husserl one-sidedly favoured the idea of arriving at evidence of the laws governing a phenomenon via the path of phenomenological and eidetic reduction, he lost sight of the other side of the story; namely, that of the constituting of reality, the permeation in any experimental situation of the percept with ideal conceptual content. He has no interest in the possibility of forming an experimental judgement entirely at the perception pole of the cognitive spectrum, because for him sensory perception was always assumed to involve some aspect of the universal. This is expressed in his "universal passive belief in being", the full import of which can only be understood apart from the realm of the senses (Husserl, 1973, p. 30). In contrast to this, Witzmann locates his central field of research in events where the intuitive and experimental are combined, where reality is constituted within the dynamic interaction between deconstructed stimulus and constructive concept. This will be explained in more detail in what follows.

The response-evoking sensory stimulus offers *nothing* that could be described as experiential or life-world integration – which is entirely in keeping with Steiner's and Witzmann's findings on "pure experience" or "pure content of observation" (Steiner, 1924/2003, p. 26 / 1918/1958, p. 41)⁴. It appears initially as an unstable, totally fragmented and unqualified product of decomposition, which only takes on viable form through active thinking and observation (Witzmann, 1984b; Wagemann, 2010). That Husserl, by contrast, speaks – unawares – in terms of an already "recomposed" state of perception is shown, for instance, by the following quotation: "[...] What affects us from the current passively given background is not a completely empty something, some datum or other (we have no really exact word for it) as yet entirely without sense, a datum absolutely unfamiliar to us. [...] What is thus apprehended has, accordingly, its own *empty horizon of familiar unfamiliarity* which is to be described as the universal horizon 'object', with particular indications or, rather, prescriptions [...]" (Husserl, 1973, p. 37/38). The ambivalent expressions here – "familiar unfamiliarity" (universalised percept) and "universal horizon 'object' with particular indications" (individualised concept) – point to a previously occurring, albeit unremarked, interaction between the two structural components of concept and percept, and will act in the further course of the exposition as

3. "The intuitively unique character of Rudolf Steiner's path of spiritual knowledge ensures that there is no contradiction in the fact that its goal can be realized anytime and anywhere. The general availability of this path to fulfilment is due to the state of the development of human consciousness the materialistic style of knowledge and action has reached. For the anti-spiritual mentality has attained that degree of wakeful clarity that can penetrate into the essence of consciousness" (Witzmann, 1988b, p. 28).

4. Here there is a clear connection to the current philosophical (McDowell-Dreyfus-) debate on the extent to which percepts are imbued with conceptual content (e.g. Scheer, 2013). Instead of treating this issue argumentatively in terms of so-called thought-experiments without sufficient connection to actual mental experience, Witzmann's approach can provide a basis in the sense of empirical-introspective research (Wagemann, Edelhäuser & Weger, 2018).

reminders of the actual fundamental process of cognition (see 3.3). Thus Husserl and his followers do not manage to penetrate through conscious observation to the deepest possible level of consciousness, even though in many respects the ready correspondence among the various findings can be very illuminating.⁵

5. Further connections and differences between philosophical phenomenology and Steiner's/Witzenmann's phenomenology of consciousness are discussed in Wagemann (2010).

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Implementing animal welfare studies into the secondary curriculum

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ABSTRACT. Education could play an important role in improving animal welfare. Much of what production animals, in particular, experience is hidden from the public. It is recognised that animals are sentient and can therefore experience pain and suffering. This creates a complex issue as most of society relies heavily on production animals for their basic needs and intensive farming enables prices to be kept low. Introducing animal welfare education into the secondary curriculum will enable students to make more informed consumer choices, thus supporting more ethical animal use. Such studies can be cross-curricula, incorporating science and ethics. There is also the opportunity for many practical enrichment activities in which students can learn animal husbandry skills. Such learning also helps to establish a sense of empathy, a vital quality for personal development.

Animals are a part of our daily lives, whether directly as pets or indirectly providing basic needs such as food and clothing. Everyone, therefore, has a responsibility to the welfare of these animals. The treatment of animals has changed dramatically since the 1920's. The idyllic farm image of animals spending their time grazing green pastures is a rarity now. The majority of production animals are intensively farmed. Many consumers are ignorant to the conditions in which these animals live, which means these industries continue to be supported. This poses an ethical issue because science has proven that all vertebrates are sentient. Educating students on the juxtaposition of improved animal welfare science and poor industry standards allows for informed decisions to be made when buying animal products. Education thus empowers consumers to bring about positive change. Steiner understood that teaching primary students about animals was important but his indications towards animal studies are few. He does, however, strongly impress the need to foster a moral compass in students and this, in turn, is required for the humane treatment of animals. Had he have lived in a time when intensive farming was so prevalent, and people were so removed from their food source perhaps his indications for animal welfare education may have been more thorough. This essay will explore the need for students in the secondary years to learn about animal welfare and ethics in the current context of animal use.

Science has been able to prove over the past few decades that animals, namely vertebrates, are sentient. 'Sentience' is the ability to experience consciousness, feelings and perceptions; including the ability to experience pain, suffering and states of wellbeing. (WAN, 2017) Humankind has a sentient body in common with the animal kingdom. (Steiner, 1907/1996, p.8-9 within Haralambous, 2018) Thus, as consumers of animal products, society has a moral obligation to care for animals, to recognise their potential to suffer and to provide a 'life worth living' (AV, 2018). Adequate animal welfare addresses the 'five freedoms': freedom from hunger and thirst; freedom from discomfort; freedom from pain, injury and disease; freedom to express normal behaviour; and freedom from fear and distress. (RSPCA, 2019) Consumers, albeit indirectly, are able to support these needs by actively seeking knowledge about animal products. For instance, animal products

that are approved by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) are from animals that have had their five freedoms met. In doing so consumers can make informed, ethical choices. Education can help students develop the knowledge and skills to become ethical consumers.

Educating students about animal issues and welfare also helps to develop empathy. Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another being. (WAN, 2017) Baron-Cohen, a professor of developmental psychopathology, says: "Empathy is the most valuable social resource in our world." (WAN, 2017) Steiner also believed that developing empathy was a vital aspect of education and that from early on teachers must create: "...solid moral foundation upon which the children can build their lives." (Steiner, 1919/2000) Children that spend time caring for animals are more likely to develop a strong sense of empathy. "In an age where most of education seeks to train the brain, [humane education] seeks to open the heart to the promptings, compassion and empathy within." (WAN, 2017) If children commit acts of cruelty towards animals, they are more likely to commit acts of violence towards people later in life. (WAS, 2017) Therefore, "Education provides opportunities to challenge values, perspectives and behaviours in order to develop a positive attitude towards animals, people and the environment." (WAN, 2017)

Most production animal industries have an element of intensive farming, colloquially known as 'factory farming'. What makes the existence of domesticated farm animals particularly cruel is not just the way in which they die but above all how they live. (Harari, 2015) Beef cattle are kept in feed lots for months prior to slaughter; dairy cows are milked mechanically to produce 20 litres of milk twice a day; battery chickens are allocated a space of an A4 piece of paper. (AA, 2019) However, it is the pork industry that seems even further removed from consumer expectations. Intensively farmed pigs are kept in crates that prohibit any movement with the exception of lying down. In response to activist pressure, the industry body, Australian Pork Limited (APL), has now reduced this time in crates from 12 months to nine. They argue that sows are less likely to squash their piglets if confined and are easier to manage, both of which are true. However, they are not able to exhibit the 'five freedoms', indicating that their welfare is compromised. Even without the plethora of research that has measured cortisol blood levels and behaviour, these conditions are far from what was once natural to pigs. Ninety-five percent of sows in Australia are kept intensively, with the remaining 5% free to range outdoors. (APL) Consequently, free range pork is very expensive. Most consumers are unaware of the industry conditions that they are supporting when they buy mainstream pork, something which I was able to witness when working for the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry in 2008. As teachers we have a responsibility to raise awareness of such issues. Equipping students with the skills and drive to enquire about the impact of their choices is the next step.

Steiner could foresee that society was at risk of becoming too materialistic and mechanised, that there were: "...things happening today to destroy civilisation..." (Steiner, 1919/1980) The mechanisation of civilisation is inversely proportional to spiritual health; the more materialistic society becomes the less connection there is with the spiritual world: "The forging together of human nature with the nature of the machine will be a significant problem for the rest of the Earth's evolution." (Steiner 1917) Intensive farming of livestock reflects this forecast: "Anthroposophy also believes that the animal kingdom, which is in need of healing in many respects, exists as a warning call to humankind." (Steiner, 1924, p123-124) Condoning the mistreatment of animals for consumer convenience indicates either a state of ignorance or a lack of empathy. Steiner intended education to heal children living in a materialistic society. (Heydebrand, 1928) He also urged for animals and plants to be brought together and cared for in a symbiotic relationship as part of his biodynamic farming system. (BA, 2019) Therefore, incorporating animal studies (welfare, ethics and science) into the curriculum builds on some of Steiner's indications for education.

Steiner suggested that students around the age of ten were ready to learn about the life sciences, starting with the animal kingdom: "The children of this age, in fourth grade, have a natural love for the animal world." (Schmitt-Stegmann, 2000) Of course, animals will have been a part of teaching before this point but not from a scientific perspective. Animal studies in grade four generally lie within the 'Animal and Human' main lesson. (ASCF) The concept of adaptation is at the core of this topic (Steiner, 1919/2000, 93-95) For example, the giraffe, with its long neck has adapted to reach leaves. Students come to understand that each animal has developed a specialisation for survival in certain environments and humans are more

generalised: "This awakens a feeling for the differences among the various animals described and the particular environments in which they live." (Schmitt-Stegmann, 2000) Steiner suggested that the animal kingdom be taught through narrative at this stage of child development. (Steiner, 1919/2000, p120) Stories ignite the students' imagination and feeling life, enabling them to build a relationship with the chosen animals. Children must first develop a love of animals: "...younger children are initially introduced to simple animal issues, and the exploration of animal sentience and needs." (WAN, 2017)

Animal welfare that looks at addressing current issues in animal production industries is best taught in secondary school when students are ready to deal with confronting issues. If Steiner were alive now, no doubt he would have supported a curriculum that built respect towards animals and raised awareness of 'factory farming'. In Australia, there is potential for animal welfare studies to be integrated into Science as it supports students to develop: "...understandings and skills to make informed decisions about local, national and global issues..." (ACARA, 2019) Students could examine the behavioural and physiological stress response of animals placed in certain conditions or undergoing routine husbandry procedures. It could also be introduced from an ethics perspective as part of Civics and Citizenship, which is, "...all about ensuring students have the skills and values to become active and informed citizens." (ACARA, 2019) Some schools offer Agriculture as a secondary subject, which focuses on the animal husbandry aspect of animal welfare. I taught Agriculture to year 9 students from 2012 to 2014 and was able to include some explicit animal welfare lessons throughout the course. Students enjoyed hands-on practicals and commented on how much they had learnt about farm practices and consumer impact.

When I started research for this assignment I contacted Stephen Tate (18 May 2019), the previous manager of the Bureau of Animal Welfare (Victorian Government), whom I worked for during 2010 and 2011. I asked him what he considered essential in an animal welfare education program. He suggested: a) to raise awareness about the various systems of intensive and extensive farming; b) to raise awareness of the best husbandry and training of pets to minimise stress and improve welfare; and c) to promote the application of the 'five freedoms'. He went on to say that the general consumer must understand that farmers conduct certain procedures because they have a net welfare benefit. For example, the dehorning of cattle is to reduce bruising during transport and caging hens reduces disease, controls nutrition and provide cleaner eggs. In contrast, certain 'free range' egg production systems may not actually provide better welfare if disease/parasite risk, predation and mortality rates increase. It is an ethical balancing act and the more information the consumer can gather the more ethical their choices will be; more ethical choices support more ethical systems.

There are some animal welfare education resources available. They are created for the benefit of animals but also to teach students about empathy. The World Animal Protection: Global Animal Network provides online lesson plans (WAP) for teachers wanting to implement animal welfare studies into their teaching as does the RSPCA or equivalent organisations across the world. The Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) provides little information about animal welfare education. Information provided by respective state and territory Departments of Education is in relation to the ethical use of animals in science. In mainstream education it is difficult for teachers to justify the implementation of animal welfare programs. There are many competing interests in the curriculum and standardised testing such as the National Assessment Program for Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) has boosted the status of literacy and numeracy leaving other areas of the curriculum behind. (Carter, 2017)

In Australia, all use of animals in education is regulated in order to protect animal welfare. In Victoria, for instance, the Department of Education and Training (DET, 2019) stipulates that animals may only be used explicitly for teaching if models or digital learning are not possible. (DET, 2019) If animals are used for teaching then, "Activities must minimise handling, discomfort, distress or pain in animals." (DET, 2019) Activities must also be approved by the Victorian Schools Animal Ethics Committee. However, there are other ways to incorporate animals into the classroom. The keeping of class pets is less regulated as is bringing in a pet for show and tell or visiting a farm or animal facility. Instead the Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals provides obligatory guidelines. In my experience, students enjoy bringing their pet to school and everyone benefits from spending time with different pets. Of course, it is important to minimise stress to the

animal by ensuring a quiet and safe environment and to state that pets are only welcome at school if they are adequately socialised. This is best for the welfare of the animals but also for the safety of the students. Additionally, many schools have begun to incorporate therapy dogs into their classrooms. This has shown to have significant welfare benefits to students. Dogs can be used for company, as a reading buddy or to reduce anxiety. Petting a dog is known to release oxytocin, a hormone that promotes calmness. The type of dogs suitable for these roles, such as Golden Retrievers or Labradors have proven to benefit from the program as well, enjoying the attention and having their own stress levels reduced. (Grove and Henderson, 2018) By monitoring blood cortisol levels and changes in behaviour, animal welfare research has determined what situations are likely to cause stress in dogs. I have looked into training my Golden Retriever at Benalla K9 Support. It is a five-day program that costs \$2,500 and dogs are only approved if they are reliable at the completion of the course.

Animal welfare main lesson:

“Acting appropriately toward animals and the rest of the natural world requires the ability to sense—and, ultimately, to acknowledge—all of the natural world’s individual spiritual beings. We sense this requirement whenever the need arises to speak about spirit not in generalities but in connection with the details of agriculture or any other human activity in the natural world.” Steiner (1924)

Threefold cycle of content elaboration

Learning experiences	Practical enrichment activities	Conceptual knowledge and skills
<p>Students may:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discuss how animals have been useful to humans over history. • Learn what the term ‘sentience’ means and what implications this has in regard to animal use. • Discuss and research what animals are used for today: food, fibre, medicines, scientific research etc. • Discuss and write about how consumers believe production animals live. (eg. are most pigs roaming paddocks?) • Discuss debate current media issues such as live export and ‘puppy farming’. Why are these issues causing concern? • Discuss how different cultures treat animals differently and where these differences stem from, such as the preparation of halal and kosher meat. • Read texts about animal welfare and ethics, such as Peter Singer’s ‘Animal Liberation’. • Use Animals Australia YouTube videos to watch footage on factory farming. Discuss whether these farming conditions meet the expectations of the consumer. • Develop research skills to critically analyse free range verses intensive production (eg. what proportion of pigs and chickens are actually free range? Is the labelling of ‘free range’ honest?) • Discuss the political and economic factors surrounding animal production. (eg. how important is farming to Australia’s economy?) • Discuss environmental issues regarding animal production. (eg. what affect does cattle farming have on climate change?) 	<p>Possible activities include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reading and listening to stories, poems, journal articles etc. on animals and animal welfare. • Bring pets to school and discuss their husbandry needs. • Complete a project on your pet. • Visit a working sheep or cattle farm as a class and observe animal handling, sheering, mulesing, castration or ear tagging procedures. • Holiday or weekend work experience on a farm and participate in husbandry activities. • Work experience with a veterinary surgeon. • Work experience at the Department of Primary Industries in policy development or field work. • Work experience with an animal shelter. • Visit an abattoir as a class. • Visit a pig or chicken farm as a class (if possible) • Visit a cattle feed lot as a class. • Invite an animal specialist to visit the class and discuss their work. 	<p>Students come to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand that animals are sentient beings. • Develop empathy towards animals. • Acquire a sense that there is hidden information regarding animal production. • Develop critical research skills. • Gain experience in animal handling or experience in observing animal handling. • Effectively debate and discuss the ethical dilemmas surrounding animal use. • Make informed decisions as a consumer. • Understand that there are cultural influences regarding animal handling and food preparation. • Develop skills in animal husbandry procedures. • Understand the political and economic implications of changing animal production policies. • Understand that there are environmental issues to consider regarding animal production.

The above table suggests a number of learning experiences, practical activities and conceptual outcomes for a main lesson on animal welfare. This outline could be adapted for students in the any of the secondary years. It encompasses the 'enacted' curriculum, designed by Gobby (2017), which allows for some flexibility in content and process. The enacted curriculum acknowledges what is actually learnt, rather than whether the planned outcomes were achieved. Discussions regarding animal welfare may diverge and evolve, individuals may choose different avenues to research and animal welfare issues may arise through the media. Additionally, learning material must be adapted to the school context: students' prior knowledge and experience in working with production animals; their cultural background; and the resources available to the school. For example, a regional school may deliver the main lesson quite differently to one in the city; some schools may be able to keep animals on campus and some schools may have access to local farms. This approach also encourages 'inquiry-based learning' which gives students some ownership over their own learning. (Wilson & Wing, 2009) Most importantly, the curriculum must be relevant, purposeful and instil wonder in the students: "The human task is not to become well-trained automatons or highly skilled manipulators of the physical world, but to become growing, questing, self-transcending agents of the evolution of spirit." (Miller, 2000 within Haralambous, 2019)

The most suitable evaluation program for this main lesson is Eisner's (1976) Educational Connoisseurship. Eisner refers to connoisseurship as appreciation; "...an awareness and an understanding of what one has experienced." (Eisner, 1976) He applies this evaluation system to the artistic elements of the curriculum. It is also suited to the social sciences, such as animal welfare. Educational Connoisseurship is qualitative. It is not based on standardisation, precision and definite answers. Students are not taught what is right or wrong in terms of the treatment of production animals. They are taught to make individual value judgments. Thus, evaluation questions include: How do the children participate? To what extent do they participate both psychologically and verbally in what transpires? Are they learning what is taught or are they learning other things conveyed by the manner of teaching? (Eisner, 1976) These questions could form the basis of a reflective teacher questionnaire used to evaluate the process and outcomes of this main lesson. This style of evaluation corresponds well to Gobby's enacted curriculum as it analyses *what is* and *what is becoming*, rather than *what should be*.

Animal welfare is an important subject to include in both the primary and secondary curriculum. However, raising an awareness of contentious animal welfare issues, such intensive farming, is appropriate for secondary students. At this stage they are mature enough to deal with confronting realities and are starting to make independent consumer choices. Animal welfare education can help to foster a respect for animals. It can also help develop empathy amongst people. Steiner strongly supported a curriculum that nurtured students' moral compass and most likely would have wanted to raise awareness of animal treatment and develop a sense of responsibility towards animals in students today. Animal welfare and consumer choice suits an inquiry-based, enacted curriculum. Valuable curriculum evaluation through such methods as Eisner's Educational Connoisseurship could ensure that animal welfare studies become an integral part of all secondary education in the future.

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La implementación del estudio sobre bienestar animal en el currículo de la enseñanza secundaria

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RESUMEN. La educación podría desempeñar un papel importante en el mejoramiento del bienestar de los animales. Gran parte de la producción animal, en particular, su quehacer, está oculto al público. Se reconoce que los animales son seres sintientes y, por lo tanto, pueden experimentar dolor y sufrimiento. Esto crea un problema complejo ya que la mayoría de la sociedad depende en gran medida de los animales de producción para sus necesidades básicas, al igual que de la agricultura intensiva la cual permite que los precios se mantengan bajos. El estudio del bienestar animal en el currículo de la enseñanza secundaria puede permitir a los estudiantes tomar decisiones mejor informadas como consumidores, respaldando así el uso ético de los animales. Este estudio puede ser transversal, incorporando ciencia y ética. También existe la variedad de actividades prácticas de enriquecimiento en las que los estudiantes pueden aprender destrezas para la cría de animales. Tal aprendizaje también ayuda a establecer un sentido de empatía, una cualidad vital para el desarrollo personal.

Los animales son parte de nuestra vida diaria, ya sea directamente como mascotas o indirectamente proveyendo necesidades básicas como alimentos y ropa. Cada uno de nosotros, por lo tanto, tiene la responsabilidad del bienestar de los animales. El tratamiento de los animales ha cambiado dramáticamente desde la década de 1920. La imagen idílica de la granja de animales que pasan su tiempo pastando pastos verdes es una rareza ahora. La mayoría de los animales de producción son criados de manera intensiva. Muchos consumidores desconocen las condiciones en que viven estos animales, lo cual significa que estas industrias siguen de alguna manera respaldadas. Esto plantea un problema ético porque la ciencia ha demostrado que todos los vertebrados son sintientes. Educar a los alumnos sobre la yuxtaposición de la ciencia avanzada sobre el bienestar animal y los estándares de bajo nivel de la industria permite tomar decisiones informadas al comprar productos derivados de los animales. La educación, por lo tanto, empodera a los consumidores para lograr un cambio positivo. Steiner entendió que era importante enseñar a los alumnos de primaria sobre los animales, pero sus indicaciones al respecto son escasas. Sin embargo, él insiste en la necesidad de fomentar un ámbito moral en los estudiantes y esto, a su vez, es necesario para el trato humano de los animales. Si él hubiera vivido en una época en que la agricultura intensiva era tan frecuente y las personas estaban tan alejadas de su fuente de alimentos, tal vez sus indicaciones para la educación sobre el bienestar animal podrían haber sido más exhaustivas. Este ensayo explorará la necesidad de que los estudiantes en la enseñanza secundaria aprendan sobre el bienestar animal y la ética en el contexto actual del uso de animales.

La ciencia ha podido demostrar en las últimas décadas que los animales, a saber, los vertebrados, son sintientes. 'Sintiencia' es la capacidad de experimentar conciencia, sentimientos y percepciones; incluyendo la capacidad de experimentar dolor, sufrimiento y estados de bienestar (WAN, 2017). El ser humano tiene un cuerpo sintiente en común con el reino animal (Steiner, 1907/1996, p. 8-9 en Haralambous, 2018). Por lo tanto, como consumidores de productos animales, la sociedad tiene la obligación moral de cuidar de ellos, reconocer los alcances de sufrimiento y proporcionar una 'vida digna de vivir' (AV, 2018). El bienestar animal adecuado aborda las 'cinco libertades': Libre de hambre y sed; libre de incomodidad; libre de dolor,

lesiones y enfermedades; libertad para expresar el comportamiento normal; y libre de miedo y angustia (RSPCA, 2019). Los consumidores, aunque indirectamente, pueden apoyar estas necesidades al buscar activamente conocimiento sobre productos derivados de los animales. Por ejemplo, los productos animales que están aprobados por la Real Sociedad para la Prevención de la Crueldad contra los Animales (RSPCA) provienen de animales que han cumplido sus cinco libertades. Al hacerlo, los consumidores pueden tomar decisiones informadas y éticas. La educación puede ayudar a los estudiantes a desarrollar el conocimiento y las habilidades para convertirse en consumidores éticos.

Educar a los estudiantes sobre temas relacionados con los animales y el bienestar animal también ayuda a desarrollar empatía. La empatía es la habilidad de comprender y compartir los sentimientos de otro ser (WAN, 2017). Baron-Cohen, profesor de psicopatología del desarrollo, dice: “La empatía es el recurso social más valioso en nuestro mundo” (WAN, 2017). Steiner también creía que desarrollar la empatía era un aspecto vital de la educación y que a temprana edad, los maestros deben promover: “... una base moral sólida sobre la cual los niños puedan construir sus vidas” (Steiner, 1919/2000). Los niños que pasan tiempo cuidando animales tienen más probabilidades de desarrollar un fuerte sentido de empatía. “En una época en la que la mayor parte de la educación busca entrenar el cerebro, [la educación humana] busca abrir el corazón a la ayuda, la compasión y la empatía” (WAN, 2017). Si los niños cometen actos de crueldad hacia los animales, son más propensos a cometer actos de violencia hacia las personas más adelante en la vida (WAN, 2017). Por lo tanto, “La educación brinda oportunidades para cuestionar valores, perspectivas y comportamientos con el fin de desarrollar una actitud positiva hacia los animales, las personas y el medio ambiente” (WAN, 2017).

La mayoría de las industrias de producción animal tienen un elemento de cría intensiva, coloquialmente conocido como “cría industrial”. No es solo la forma en que mueren los animales de granja domesticados lo que hace que sea particularmente cruel sino también la forma en la que viven (Harari, 2015). El ganado bovino se mantiene en lotes de alimentación durante meses antes del sacrificio; las vacas lecheras se ordeñan mecánicamente para producir 20 litros de leche dos veces al día; a los pollos en ponederos automáticos se les asigna un espacio de una hoja de papel A4 (AA, 2019). Sin embargo, es la industria porcina es la que parece aún más alejada de las expectativas del consumidor. Los cerdos de cría intensiva se mantienen en jaulas que limitan cualquier movimiento con la excepción de acostarse. En respuesta a la presión activista, el organismo de la industria porcina, Australian Pork Limited (APL), ahora ha reducido este tiempo en jaulas de doce a nueve meses. Ellos argumentan que las cerdas tienen menos probabilidades de aplastar a sus lechones si están confinadas y son más fáciles de manejar, lo cual es cierto. Sin embargo, ellos no presentan las “cinco libertades”, lo que indica que el bienestar está comprometido. Incluso sin la gran cantidad de investigaciones que han medido los niveles y el comportamiento sanguíneo de cortisol, estas condiciones están lejos de ser lo que alguna vez fue natural para los cerdos. Noventa y cinco por ciento de las cerdas en Australia se mantienen en cría intensiva, con el 5% restante criado al aire libre (APL). En consecuencia, el cerdo de corral es muy costoso. La mayoría de los consumidores desconocen las condiciones de la industria que están apoyando cuando compran carne de cerdo convencional, algo que yo misma pude presenciar cuando trabajé para el Departamento de Agricultura, Pesca y Silvicultura de Australia en el año 2008. Como maestros tenemos la responsabilidad de crear conciencia sobre estos problemas. El siguiente paso es equipar a los estudiantes con las habilidades y el impulso para preguntarse sobre el impacto de sus elecciones.

Steiner logró prever que la sociedad corría el riesgo de volverse demasiado materialista y mecanizada, que existen: “... cosas que suceden hoy para destruir la civilización ...” (Steiner, 1919/1980). La mecanización de la civilización es inversamente proporcional a la salud espiritual; cuanto más materialista sea la sociedad, menos conexión habrá con el mundo espiritual: “La unión de la naturaleza humana con la naturaleza de la máquina será un problema importante para el resto de la evolución de la Tierra” (Steiner, 1917). La producción ganadera intensiva refleja este pronóstico: “La antroposofía también cree que el reino animal, el cual está en necesidad de curación en muchos aspectos, existe como una forma de alerta para la humanidad” (Steiner, 1924, p. 123-124). Tolerar el maltrato de los animales por conveniencia del consumidor indica un estado de ignorancia o una falta de empatía. Steiner tenía la intención de educar a los niños en una sociedad materialista (Heydebrand, 1928). También él recomendó que los animales y las plantas estuvieran juntos y

fueran cuidados en una relación simbiótica como parte de su sistema de agricultura biodinámica (BA, 2019). Por lo tanto, incorporar estudios de animales (bienestar, ética y ciencia) en el plan de estudios es una de las indicaciones de Steiner para la educación.

Steiner sugirió que los niños alrededor de los diez años estaban listos para aprender sobre las ciencias naturales, comenzando con el reino animal: “Los niños de esta edad, en cuarto grado, tienen un amor natural por el mundo animal” (Schmitt-Stegmann, 2000). Por supuesto, los animales habrán sido parte de la enseñanza antes de este punto, pero no desde una perspectiva científica. El estudio del reino animal en el cuarto grado generalmente se encuentra dentro de la lección principal “Animales y el ser humano” (ASCF). El concepto de adaptación es el núcleo de este tema (Steiner, 1919/2000, p. 93-95). Por ejemplo, la jirafa, con su cuello largo, se ha adaptado para alcanzar las hojas. Los estudiantes llegan a comprender que cada animal ha desarrollado una especialización para la supervivencia en ciertos entornos y el ser humano es un tema más generalizado: “Esto despierta una sensación sobre las diferencias entre los diversos animales presentados y los entornos particulares en los que viven” (Schmitt-Stegmann, 2000). Steiner sugirió que el reino animal se enseñara a través de la narrativa en esta etapa del desarrollo infantil (Steiner, 1919/2000, p. 120). Las historias despiertan en los estudiantes la imaginación y el sentimiento de vida, permitiéndoles construir una relación con los animales elegidos. Los niños primero deben desarrollar un amor por los animales: “... a los niños más pequeños se les presentan inicialmente situaciones simples con los animales y la exploración de la sintiencia y las necesidades de dichos animales” (WAN, 2017).

El bienestar de los animales que se enfoca en abordar los problemas actuales en las industrias de producción animal se enseña mejor en la escuela secundaria cuando los estudiantes están listos para analizar dichos problemas. Si Steiner estuviera vivo ahora, sin duda habría apoyado un plan de estudios que fomentara el respeto hacia los animales y creara conciencia sobre la ‘agricultura industrial’. En Australia, existe la posibilidad de que los estudios sobre el bienestar animal se integren en la Ciencia, ya que ayuda a los estudiantes a desarrollar: “... entendimiento y habilidades para tomar decisiones informadas sobre problemas locales, nacionales y globales ...” (ACARA, 2019). Los estudiantes pueden examinar el comportamiento y la respuesta al estrés fisiológico de los animales que viven en ciertas condiciones o sometidos a procedimientos habituales de cría. Esto también se puede presentar desde una perspectiva ética como parte de Educación Cívica y Ciudadanía, que es, “... todo aquello que garantice que los estudiantes tengan las habilidades y valores para convertirse en ciudadanos activos e informados” (ACARA, 2019). Algunas escuelas ofrecen agricultura como asignatura paralela, que se centra en procedimientos del bienestar animal en la cría. Enseñé agricultura a estudiantes de noveno año entre 2012 y 2014 y logré incluir algunas lecciones explícitas de bienestar animal a lo largo del curso. Los estudiantes disfrutaron de actividades prácticas y comentaron cuánto habían aprendido sobre las prácticas agrícolas y el impacto del consumidor.

Cuando comencé a investigar al respecto, contacté a Stephen Tate (18 de mayo de 2019), el anterior gerente de la Oficina de Bienestar Animal (Gobierno de Victoria), para quien trabajé durante 2010 y 2011. Le pregunté qué consideraba esencial en un programa de educación sobre el bienestar animal. Él sugirió: a) crear conciencia sobre los diversos sistemas de agricultura intensiva y extensiva; b) crear conciencia sobre los mejores procedimientos de cría y entrenamiento de mascotas para minimizar el estrés y mejorar el bienestar; y c) promover la aplicación de las ‘cinco libertades’. Continuó diciendo que el consumidor general debe comprender que los agricultores realizan ciertos procedimientos porque tienen un beneficio neto de bienestar. Por ejemplo, el descornado del ganado es para reducir los hematomas durante el transporte y las gallinas enjauladas reducen las enfermedades, controlan la nutrición y proporcionan huevos más limpios. En contraste, ciertos sistemas de producción de huevos de ‘campo libre’ en realidad pueden no proporcionar un mejor bienestar si aumentan las tasas de riesgo de enfermedad y parásitos, depredación y mortalidad. Es un acto de equilibrio ético y cuanta más información el consumidor pueda reunir, más éticas serán sus elecciones. Y de igual manera, más elecciones éticas apoyan sistemas más éticos.

Hay algunos recursos de educación sobre bienestar animal disponibles. Se crean para el beneficio de los animales, pero también para enseñar a los estudiantes sobre la empatía. La *Protección Animal Mundial: Red Global de Animales* proporciona planes de clase en línea (WAP) para maestros que desean implementar estudios de bienestar animal en su enseñanza al igual que la RSPCA u organizaciones equivalentes en todo

el mundo. La Autoridad Australiana del Currículo, Evaluación e Informes (ACARA por sus siglas en inglés) proporciona poca información sobre la educación en bienestar animal. La información proporcionada por los respectivos departamentos de educación estatales y territoriales está relacionada con el uso ético de los animales en la ciencia. En la educación general, es difícil para los maestros justificar la implementación de programas de bienestar animal. Hay muchos intereses en competencia en el plan de estudios y las pruebas estandarizadas, como el Programa Nacional de Evaluación de la Alfabetización y la Aritmética (NAPLAN) que han impulsado la importancia de la alfabetización y la aritmética dejando atrás otras áreas del plan de estudios (Carter, 2017).

En Australia, todo uso de animales en la educación está regulado para proteger el bienestar animal. En Victoria, por ejemplo, el Departamento de Educación y Capacitación (DET por sus siglas en inglés, 2019) estipula que los animales solo pueden usarse explícitamente para la enseñanza si no es posible el aprendizaje digital o modelos de aprendizaje (DET, 2019). Si los animales se usan para la enseñanza, entonces, “Las actividades deben minimizar el manejo, la incomodidad, la angustia o el dolor en los animales” (DET, 2019). Las actividades también deben ser aprobadas por el Comité de Ética Animal de las Escuelas de Victoria. Sin embargo, hay otras formas de incorporar animales en el aula. El hecho de tener una mascota escolar está menos regulado al igual que traer una mascota para mostrar y narrarle historias o visitar una granja o centro de animales. En cambio, el Código de Prácticas para el Bienestar de los Animales proporciona pautas obligatorias. En mi experiencia, los estudiantes disfrutaban de traer a su mascota a la escuela y todos se benefician de pasar tiempo con diferentes mascotas. Por supuesto, es importante minimizar el estrés del animal asegurando un ambiente tranquilo y seguro y asegurando que las mascotas solo son bienvenidas en la escuela si están socializadas adecuadamente. Esto es muy adecuado no sólo para el bienestar de los animales sino también para la seguridad de los estudiantes. Además, muchas escuelas han comenzado a incorporar perros de terapia en sus aulas. Esto ha demostrado tener importantes beneficios de bienestar para los estudiantes. Los perros pueden ser utilizados para compañía, como compañeros de lectura o para reducir la ansiedad. Se sabe que acariciar a un perro libera oxitocina, una hormona que promueve la calma. El tipo de perros adecuados para estos roles, como Golden Retrievers o Labradors, también se han beneficiado del programa, disfrutando de la atención y reduciendo sus propios niveles de estrés (Grove & Henderson, 2018). Al monitorear los niveles de cortisol en sangre y los cambios en el comportamiento, la investigación del bienestar animal ha determinado qué situaciones pueden causar estrés en los perros. He estudiado cómo entrenar a mi Golden Retriever en la institución K9 Support in Benalla, Australia. Es un programa de cinco días que cuesta \$2,500 y los perros sólo se certifican si son confiables al finalizar el curso.

Lección principal de bienestar animal:

“Actuar correctamente con los animales y el resto del mundo natural requiere la capacidad de sentir y, en el fondo, reconocer a todos los seres espirituales individuales del mundo natural. Sentimos este llamado cada vez que surge la necesidad de hablar sobre el espíritu, no a través de generalidades, sino en relación con las particularidades de la agricultura o con cualquier otra actividad humana en el mundo natural” (Steiner, 1924)

Triple perspectiva de elaboración de contenidos

Experiencias de aprendizaje	Actividades prácticas de enriquecimiento	Conocimientos y habilidades
<p>Los estudiantes pueden:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discutir cómo los animales han sido útiles para los humanos a lo largo de la historia. • Aprender qué significa el término ‘Sintiencia’ y qué implicaciones tiene en relación con el uso de animales. • Discutir e investigar para qué se usan los animales hoy en día: Alimentos, fibra, medicamentos, investigación científica, etc. • Discutir y escribir sobre cómo los consumidores creen que viven los animales de producción (por ejemplo, ¿la mayoría de los cerdos andan por los potreros?). • Debatar sobre temas actuales en los medios como la exportación de animales vivos y la ‘cría de cachorros’. ¿Por qué preocupan estos problemas? • Discutir cómo otras culturas tratan a los animales de otra manera y de dónde provienen estas diferencias. Por ejemplo la preparación y exigencia del halal y kosher. • Leer textos sobre la ética y el bienestar de los animales, como “Liberación Animal” de Peter Singer. • Utilizar los videos de YouTube de animales en Australia para ver imágenes sobre la agricultura industrial. Discutir si estas condiciones de cultivo cumplen con las expectativas del consumidor. • Desarrollar habilidades de investigación para analizar críticamente la producción intensiva y la producción al aire libre (por ejemplo, ¿qué proporción de cerdos y pollos son realmente de producción libre? ¿Es honesto el etiquetado de ‘al aire libre’?) • Discutir los factores políticos y económicos que rodean la producción animal. (por ejemplo, ¿cuán importante es la agricultura para la economía de Australia?) • Discutir temas ambientales relacionados con la producción animal. (por ejemplo, ¿qué efecto tiene la ganadería en el cambio climático?) 	<p>Las posibles actividades incluyen:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leer y escuchar historias, poemas, artículos de revistas, etc. sobre animales y bienestar animal. • Traer mascotas a la escuela y discutir sus necesidades de crianza. • Completar un proyecto sobre la mascota. • Visitar en grupo una granja con ovejas o ganado en funcionamiento y observar los procedimientos de manipulación, esquila, mutilación, castración o marcado de animales. • Realizar prácticas durante las vacaciones o fines de semana en una granja y participar en actividades de crianza. • Realizar prácticas con un cirujano veterinario. • Realizar prácticas en el Departamento de Industrias Primarias para el desarrollo de políticas o trabajo de campo. • Realizar prácticas en un refugio de animales. • Visitar en grupo un matadero. • Visitar en grupo una granja de cerdos o pollos (si es posible) • Visitar en grupo un lote de alimentación de ganado. • Invitar a un especialista en animales a la clase y discutir su trabajo. 	<p>Los estudiantes llegan a:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprender que los animales tienen la capacidad de experimentar dolor, sufrimiento y estados de bienestar. • Desarrollar empatía hacia los animales. • Adquirir la sensación de que hay información oculta sobre la producción animal. • Desarrollar habilidades de investigación crítica. • Adquirir experiencia en el manejo de animales o experiencia en la observación sobre la distribución de los animales. • Debatar y argumentar sobre los dilemas éticos que rodean el uso de animales. • Tomar decisiones informadas como consumidores. • Comprender que hay influencias culturales con respecto al manejo de los animales y la preparación de alimentos. • Desarrollar habilidades en los procedimientos de crianza de animales. • Comprender las implicaciones políticas y económicas sobre el cambio de las políticas de producción animal. • Comprender que hay cuestiones ambientales a considerar con respecto a la producción animal.

La tabla anterior sugiere una serie de experiencias de aprendizaje, actividades prácticas y logros cognitivos para una lección principal sobre el bienestar animal. Este esquema podría adaptarse para estudiantes en cualquiera de los años de enseñanza secundaria. Abarca el plan de estudios ‘aprobado’, diseñado por Gobby (2017), que permite cierta flexibilidad en el contenido y el proceso. Este plan de estudios reconoce lo que realmente se aprende, en lugar de si los resultados planificados se lograron. Las discusiones sobre el bienestar animal pueden diferir y evolucionar, las personas pueden elegir diferentes caminos para la investigación y los problemas de bienestar animal pueden surgir a través de los medios de comunicación. Además, el material de aprendizaje debe adaptarse al contexto escolar: El conocimiento previo y la experiencia de los estudiantes al trabajar con animales de producción; el trasfondo cultural de los estudiantes; y los recursos disponibles para la escuela. Por ejemplo, una escuela regional puede impartir la lección principal de manera muy diferente a una escuela en la ciudad; algunas pueden mantener animales en sus campos y algunas pueden tener acceso a granjas locales. Este enfoque también fomenta el “aprendizaje basado en la indagación”, que les da a los estudiantes cierta propiedad sobre su propio aprendizaje (Wilson & Wing, 2009). Lo más importante es que el plan de estudios debe ser relevante, con propósitos y que inculque asombro en los estudiantes: “La tarea humana no es convertirse en autómatas bien entrenados o manipuladores altamente calificados del mundo físico, sino agentes de continuo desarrollo, en continua búsqueda y auto trascendencia de la evolución del espíritu” (Miller, 2000 en Haralambous, 2019).

El programa de evaluación más adecuado para esta lección principal es el Entendimiento Educativo de Eisner (1976). Él se refiere al entendimiento como apreciación; “... una conciencia y una comprensión de lo que uno ha experimentado” (Eisner, 1976). Él implementa este sistema de evaluación a los elementos artísticos del plan de estudios. También es adecuado para las ciencias sociales, como el bienestar animal. El Entendimiento Educativo es cualitativo. No se basa en la estandarización, precisión y respuestas definitivas. A los estudiantes no se les enseña lo que está bien o mal en términos del tratamiento de animales de producción. Se les enseña a hacer juicios de valor individuales. Por lo tanto, las preguntas de evaluación incluyen: ¿Cómo participan los niños? ¿En qué medida participan tanto psicológica como verbalmente en lo que sucede? ¿Están aprendiendo lo que se les enseña o están aprendiendo otras cosas transmitidas a través de la forma de enseñar? (Eisner, 1976). Estas preguntas podrían formar la base de un cuestionario reflexivo para maestros utilizado para evaluar el proceso y los logros de esta lección de clase principal. Este estilo de evaluación corresponde adecuadamente con el plan de estudios aprobado de Gobby, ya que analiza lo que es y lo que se está *llegando a ser*, en lugar de lo que *debería ser*.

El bienestar animal es un tema importante para incluir tanto en el plan de estudios en enseñanza primaria como en secundaria. Sin embargo, crear conciencia sobre temas polémicos de bienestar animal, como la agricultura intensiva, es apropiado para estudiantes de secundaria. En esta etapa, los estudiantes son lo suficientemente maduros para lidiar con las realidades presentadas y están comenzando a tomar decisiones independientes como consumidores. La educación en bienestar animal puede ayudar a fomentar el respeto por los animales. También puede ayudar a desarrollar empatía entre las personas. Steiner apoyó firmemente un plan de estudios que fomentara una orientación moral de los estudiantes y probablemente hubiera querido crear conciencia sobre el tratamiento de los animales y desarrollar un sentido de responsabilidad hacia los animales en los estudiantes de hoy. El bienestar animal y la elección del consumidor se ajustan a un currículo basado en la investigación. La valiosa evaluación curricular a través de métodos tales como el Entendimiento Educativo de Eisner podría garantizar que los estudios de bienestar animal se conviertan en una parte integral de toda la educación secundaria en el futuro.

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Rezension

Johannes Kiersch

Helmut Zander: *Die Anthroposophie. Rudolf Steiners Ideen zwischen Esoterik, Weleda, Demeter und Waldorfpädagogik*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019)

Ein unbefangenes Gespräch zwischen den Schülern Rudolf Steiners und den Vertretern allgemein anerkannter wissenschaftlicher Forschung ist merkwürdiger Weise bis heute nicht recht in Gang gekommen. Woran liegt das? Nach verbreiteter Auffassung ist der Kulturhistoriker Helmut Zander die gegenwärtig maßgebende Autorität für eine fundierte Antwort auf eine solche Frage. Dieser habe, so meint man, nachgewiesen, dass der Begründer der Anthroposophie ein Eklektiker gewesen sei, ein phantasievoller Scharlatan, der im verworrenen geistigen Milieu des frühen zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts eine gläubige Gemeinde naiver Sinnsucher an sich habe binden können, im Wesentlichen mit Motiven aus der angelsächsischen Theosophie, die er dilettantisch mit überholten Ideen aus der philosophischen Tradition des deutschen Idealismus angereichert habe (Zander, 2007). Zanders Forschungsergebnisse sind von anthroposophischer Seite mehr oder weniger scharfsinnig kritisiert worden. Der womöglich gewichtigste Einwand stammt von dem Stuttgarter Philosophen Jörg Ewertowski, der die enge, an Otto Gerhard Oexle orientierte historistische Perspektive Zanders in Frage stellt (Ewertowski, 2007; 2008, S. 100ff.; 2011, S. 221). Aber das brauchte außer wenigen Spezialisten niemanden zu interessieren. Das monumentale Werk Helmut Zanders hatte die Aktivitäten der Theosophischen Gesellschaft in Deutschland mit akribischer Präzision bis in alle Einzelheiten beschrieben und Steiner darin zuverlässig verortet. Damit konnte man zufrieden sein, zumal die Ergebnisse recht genau dem entsprachen, was man ohnehin zu wissen meinte. Kaum jemand bemerkte, dass die Schlussfolgerungen, zu denen Zander gelangt war, ganz überwiegend nicht der

Fülle und der Präzision seiner Beobachtungen entstammten, sondern den zahllosen Vermutungen, Unterstellungen und spöttischen, oft auch hämischen Kommentaren, von denen sein imponierendes Werk durchsetzt ist. Ebenso wenig fiel auf, dass Zander mit seinem offen eingestandenem Leitmotiv, Steiners Lehre vom Übersinnlichen als wesentlichen ideologischen „Überbau“ zu verstehen, alles beiseite lassen konnte, was Anthroposophen als Kern der Sache betrachten. Auch machte sich kaum jemand Gedanken darüber, auf welche Weise ein angeblich so fragwürdiges Konstrukt wie Steiners Geistwelt die ganze Fülle fruchtbarer Wirkungen hervorrufen konnte, die sich inzwischen nicht mehr verleugnen lassen. Ich erlaube mir, hier einzufügen, was sich für mich nach dem Erscheinen der beiden Bände „Anthroposophie in Deutschland“ als der gewichtigste Einwand ergab: „Der prägnante Mensch, den man doch ganz selbstverständlich hinter jeder nachhaltig wirkenden geistigen Strömung erwartet, taucht bei Zander an keiner Stelle auf. Stattdessen geistert durch sein weitläufiges Werk ein diffuser Schatten, ein bemitleidenswertes, von Unsicherheit und Ehrgeiz getriebenes, moralisch labiles Unglückshuhn, von dem völlig unerfindlich bleibt, wie es die Kraft und Kompetenz gehabt haben soll, eine solche Strömung zu inaugrieren. Zander hat das Kunststück fertiggebracht, aus seiner Darstellung der Dinge das Genie Rudolf Steiners vollständig zu eliminieren.“

In seinem neuen Buch „Die Anthroposophie“ porträtiert Zander in einer lockeren Folge kleiner Essays, einem „Florilegium von punktuellen Impressionen“ (S. 12), das gegenwärtige Erscheinungsbild der von Steiner inaugurierten Bewegung. Mehr als

dreißig Jahre nach der bekannten SPIEGEL-Reportage (Brügge, 1984) ist das der erste Versuch, aus kritischer Außenperspektive einen Gesamtüberblick über das bewegte Feld anthroposophischer Aktivitäten zu riskieren, wie es sich seit Steiners Tod entwickelt hat. Offenbar hat die in seinem Basiswerk von 2007 unbeantwortet gebliebene Frage nach dem Zusammenhang der Lehre Steiners mit ihren Wirkungen den Verfasser nicht losgelassen. Zwar bleibt dieser Zusammenhang auch jetzt im Dunklen. Aber durch eine bemerkenswerte Fülle sorgfältig recherchierter und im Einzelnen belegter Informationen, die auch dem Kenner überraschend Neues bieten, wird der Leser ermuntert, sich darüber Gedanken zu machen. Zander ordnet seine Beobachtungen nach Stichworten alphabetisch, von *Alnatura bis Waldorfpädagogik und Weltanschauung – Religion – Wissenschaft*. Man erfährt, was es mit *Judith von Halle* auf sich hat, mit der internen *Konstitutionsdebatte* der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft, mit *Rassen* und *Rassismus*, mit bisher verborgenen Beziehungen zum *Lectorium Rosicrucianum* und zur *Freimaurerei*, mit anthroposophischen Meinungen zum Problem der *Masern*, mit *Sexualität* und dem Verhältnis von *Männern und Frauen* im anthroposophischen Milieu, Aktuelles also über Themen, die auch die Redaktion der BILD-Zeitung interessieren könnten. Bemerkenswert sind vor allem die informativen Kurzberichte über die anthroposophisch orientierten *Banken*, die von Steinerschülern aufgebauten *Hochschulen*, über *Landwirtschaft* nach Demeter-Methoden, *Arzneimittel / Kosmetika*, *Heilpädagogik* und *Medizin*. Verblüffend fand ich in dem Essay über anthroposophische Praxis auf den verschiedenen Lebensfeldern eine Bemerkung über die Vielfalt der Aktivitäten: „Jede Waldorfschule, jeder biodynamische Bauernhof und jede anthroposophische Klinik hat ihr eigenes Profil, so dass die Anthroposophen darauf bestehen, dass jede Einrichtung eine „Individualität“ sei. Und in der Tat machen sich Außenstehende von dieser inneranthroposophischen Pluralität oft kein angemessenes Bild. Die Anthroposophie verfügt über einen Reichtum an Facetten, von dem andere kleine religiöse oder weltanschauliche Gemeinschaften nur träumen können“ (Zander, 2019, S. 187). Diese Feststellung widerspricht mit bemerkenswerter Deutlichkeit dem verbreiteten Klischee von der monolithischen, womöglich vom Dornacher Zentrum aus gesteuerten Einheitlichkeit der anthroposophischen Praxis.

Eine Fundgrube in Zanders neuem Werk sind die zahlreichen Fußnoten mit weiterführenden Hinweisen auf Material im Internet. So werden mehrere Dissertationen und Masterarbeiten zitiert, die sich mit Problemen im anthroposophischen Milieu befassen. Themen dieser Art scheinen wenigsten da, wo es nicht auffällt, neuerdings zulässig zu sein. An die Kernfragen des anthroposophischen „Überbaus“ bei Steiner wagt sich Zander auch weiterhin nicht heran. Er übergeht fast völlig, was in dieser Hinsicht im Binnenraum der Diskussion unter Anthroposophen gründlich durchdacht worden ist. Beim Stichwort *Reinkarnation* beispielsweise ist weder von Emil Bocks klassischer Studie zu diesem Thema (Bock 1996) die Rede noch von der breit fundierten „Philosophie der Wiederverkörperung“ von Renatus Ziegler, einem der kompetentesten Erkenntnistheoretiker der anthroposophischen Bewegung (Ziegler, 2015). Dieser wäre für Helmut Zander, der als Theologe über das heikle Thema selbst gründlich geforscht hat (Zander, 1995), ein idealer Gesprächspartner. Aber so jemanden darf es offenbar nicht geben.

Das naheliegende Stichwort *Goethe* fehlt ganz. Zander geht an der beeindruckenden Fülle von Publikationen über Steiner und den „Kopernikus und Kepler der organischen Welt“ (Steiner, 1987, S. 107), die von anthroposophisch orientierten Sachkennern und anderen Gelehrten über Jahrzehnte hin erarbeitet worden ist, achtlos vorbei. Vor allem aber bleiben bei ihm, wie schon in seinem Basis-Werk von 2007, Steiners wissenschaftstheoretische Ausführungen völlig außer Betracht, seine Grundsatzklärung von 1917, das Buch „Von Seelenrätseln“ (Steiner, 1983), die unter Anthroposophen oft zitierte Abhandlung über „Die psychologischen Grundlagen und die erkenntnistheoretische Stellung der Theosophie“, die Steiner schon im Jahre 1911 auf dem Internationalen Philosophen-Kongress in Bologna vorgestellt hat, und die übrigen in Sammelbänden zusammengefassten späteren Aufsätze zu den Forschungsmethoden der Anthroposophie (Steiner, 1961 und 1965). All diese Texte, mit denen Steiner sein Projekt einer „Erkenntnislehre der Geheimwissenschaft“ von 1905 (Steiner, 1993, S. 15) schrittweise realisiert hat, bedürfen einer weitaus gründlicheren Diskussion als sie bisher zustande gekommen ist (Kiersch, 2016).

In „Von Seelenrätseln“ zeigt Steiner, wie die von Sinnesdaten ausgehende empirische Forschung, die er hier etwas eigenwillig als „Anthropologie“ bezeichnet, zu seiner „Anthroposophie“ steht, die mit übersinnlichen Wahrnehmungen beginnt. Beide Forschungsweisen erschienen auf den ersten Blick so verschieden wie Schwarz und Weiß und nicht miteinander vereinbar. Beide gelangten jedoch durch logische Gedankenarbeit zu einem Bild vom Menschen, und die so gewonnenen Bilder seien bei unvoreingenommener Vorgehensweise bis in jede Einzelheit miteinander kompatibel, wie eine positive und eine negative Fotoplatte (Steiner 1983, S.11ff.).

Hier wird besonders deutlich, dass Steiner nicht die Absicht hatte, mit seiner Lehre den ergebnisoffenen, niemals endgültig abschließbaren Forschungsprozess, den Zander mit Recht als entscheidendes Merkmal moderner Wissenschaft beschreibt (Zander 2019, S. 273), durch eine Dogmatik absolut gültiger anthroposophischer Wahrheiten zu ersetzen, wie noch heute immer wieder, und nicht zuletzt von Helmut Zander, behauptet wird. Am Beispiel einer Auseinandersetzung mit den Argumenten eines Gegners, des Ästhetikers Max Dessoir, und eines potentiellen Diskussionspartners, des Philosophen Franz Brentano, zeigt Steiner in „Von Seelenrätseln“, wie das angestrebte Gespräch verlaufen könnte. Im Anhang des Buches skizziert er dann eigene Forschungsergebnisse, darunter seine Lehre von den drei Seelenvermögen des Denkens, des Fühlens und des Wollens in ihrem Verhältnis zum Leib und zum „Geist“ des Menschen, die vor allem für pädagogisch und therapeutisch tätige Anthroposophen von grundlegender Bedeutung und dem entsprechend breit rezipiert und im Detail ausgearbeitet worden ist (Lutzker & Zdražil, 2019, mit weiterführenden Hinweisen). Von dieser Thematik ist in der Tradition der Blavatsky-Theosophie nirgends die Rede. Steiner hat die Kerngedanken dafür aus seiner Bemühung um die Organologie Goethes und aus langjährigem meditativen Umgang mit den Symbol-Bildern von dessen „Märchen“ aus den „Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten“ gewonnen (Kiersch, 2011). Was veranlasst einen kompetenten Historiker wie Helmut Zander, an all dem achtlos vorbeizugehen?

Es bietet sich an, dem charakterisierten verqueren Tatbestand mit dem wissenschaftssoziologischen Begriffsinstrumentarium beizukommen, das wir dem polnischen Mediziner Ludwik Fleck verdanken, der

schon im Jahre 1935 über das Zustandekommen und die unerwarteten Veränderungen wissenschaftlicher Forschungsergebnisse nachgedacht hat. Dieser beschreibt, wie das wissenschaftliche Gespräch bis hin zur Präsentation von „Tatsachen“ von unbewussten Vorurteilen, Einstellungen und Stimmungen der Teilnehmer beeinflusst wird, von einem spezifischen „Denkstil“, der sich unter den Teilnehmern des „Denkkollektivs“ im Lauf der Zeit entwickelt und unter der Leitung der maßgeblichen „Eingeweihten“ [sic!] für jeden Neuling zum Zwang wird, dem er sich anzupassen hat (Fleck, 1980, S. 129ff). Am Beispiel des Anblicks einer Bakterienkultur durch das Mikroskop, der ihm als Fachmann für Serologie vertraut war, zeigt Fleck, wie verwirrend vielfältig sich das noch nicht von Begriffen erfasste Wahrnehmungsfeld ausnimmt, wie der geschulte Beobachter Einzelheiten, die er wiedererkennt, daraus hervorhebt, andere dafür beiseite lässt, wie im Gespräch unter Fachleuten nach und nach geklärt wird, was wichtig ist, und sich daraus eine durch offene Fragen, Unsicherheiten, Vermutungen charakterisierte „Zeitschriften-Wissenschaft“ ergibt, wie deren vorläufige Ergebnisse in einer „Handbuch-Wissenschaft“ weiter konsolidiert werden und schließlich die Sphäre der Lehrbücher erreichen, in welcher nur noch die eindeutig gesicherten „Tatsachen“ erscheinen (Fleck 1980, S. 146ff.). Diesen Weg geht jede Wissenschaft: vom Wahrnehmen einer diffusen, verwirrenden Realität zu Beginn der Forschung bis hin zu einer stabilen, aber doch in jedem Fall von einem nicht bewusst reflektierten „Denkstil“ geprägten Begriffsbildung, die vom Laienpublikum als gesicherte Wahrheit aufgefasst wird, Steiners Anthroposophie ebenso wie jede Einzelwissenschaft, die im Diskussionsfeld der modernen Scientific Community mit verwandten Auffassungen konkurriert. Die Welt der Laien akzeptiert die im Prinzip durchaus vorläufigen Ergebnisse wissenschaftlicher Autorität genau so als gültige Wahrheit wie die Glaubensgemeinschaft traditionsbewusster Anthroposophen die Inhalte der Rudolf Steiner-Gesamtausgabe. Daraus folgt nicht, dass Steiner selbst, wie Zander nachzuweisen meint, seine Ideen oder Forschungsergebnisse als absolut gültig betrachtet habe.

Für das Verständnis der Lage, in der sich Forscher wie Helmut Zander befinden, sind Flecks Beobachtungen über das Verhältnis des esoterischen Kreises der Wissenden zur exoterischen Masse des Laienpublikums von besonderem Interesse. Die Wissenden, so Fleck, belehren nicht nur, sie orientieren sich

zugleich an den Erwartungen ihres Umkreises. Mit dieser Einsicht werden irrationale Mode-Erscheinungen wie der Zahlenfetischismus und der Messbarkeitswahn im heutigen Medienwesen aufschlussreich beleuchtet, aber auch die Arbeitsweise Helmut Zanders. Der erfolgreiche Steiner-Forscher hat mit der verbreiteten Stimmung zu rechnen, dass es seine Pflicht sei, den theosophischen „Guru“ Steiner zu entlarven. Was dieser Stimmung widerspricht, muss unberücksichtigt bleiben.

Man sollte Zander nicht unterstellen, dass er mit dem unaufdringlichen Beiseitelassen gewisser Problemfelder Steiner oder seine Anhänger diskreditieren wolle. Als Glied des Denkkollektivs der modernen Scientific Community kann er nicht anders vorgehen als er es tut. Ärgerlich ist allenfalls die naiv anmutende Selbstverständlichkeit, mit der er seinen Äußerungen über die Merkmale moderner wissenschaftlicher Forschung den Denkstil und die sichere Gültigkeit einer zeitgebundenen Vorstellungswelt zugrunde legt, die längst fragwürdig geworden ist. Vor Jahren schon hat Gernot Böhme das „Ende des Baconschen Zeitalters“ proklamiert (Böhme, 1993). Ernst zu nehmende Querdenker wie Paul Feyer-

abend mit seiner postum veröffentlichten „Naturphilosophie“ (Feyerabend, 2018)), der amerikanische Philosoph Thomas Nagel mit seiner Studie über „Geist und Kosmos“ (Nagel, 2013) haben ernste Zweifel angemeldet. Und erst recht natürlich geben die gegenwärtigen Debatten über verheerende ökologische und ökonomische Folgen des einstweilen noch vorherrschenden Wissenschaftsparadigmas Anlass zum Nachdenken. Helmut Zander hat in seinem Grundlagenwerk von 2007 mit beeindruckendem Erfolg die historischen Umstände dargestellt, unter denen sich Steiners Anthroposophie entfalten konnte, im Besonderen auch die Schicksale und Beiträge der beteiligten Akteure. Dieses Bemühen prägt auch das neue Buch, und dafür darf man ihm danken. Aber seine zentrale These von 2007, dass Steiners Lebenswerk nichts als eine Art Wurmfortsatz der Blavatsky-Theosophie gewesen sei, darf nach wie vor in Frage gestellt werden. Der Untertitel des neuen Buches ist irreführend. Zander hat *Weleda, Demeter, Waldorfpädagogik* und das Milieu, in dem sie aufgeblüht sind, einfühlsam und kenntnisreich dargestellt, aber immer noch nicht *Rudolf Steiners Ideen*.

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Rezension / Book review

Johannes Kiersch

Helmut Zander: *Anthroposophy. Rudolf Steiner's Ideas from Esotericism to Weleda, Demeter and Waldorf Education*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019)

Strange as it may seem, to this day an open dialogue between those who follow Rudolf Steiner and representatives of mainstream academia has never got properly underway. Why is this? The widespread opinion is that the cultural historian, Helmut Zander, is currently the author best placed to give a well-founded answer to such a question. He is credited with having proved that the founder of anthroposophy was simply a collector of cultural curiosities, a charlatan with an over-active imagination, who in the spiritual miasma of the early twentieth century gathered around himself a gullible coterie of truth-seekers, mainly using motifs from Anglo-Saxon theosophy, which he amateurishly laced with outworn ideas from the philosophical tradition of German idealism (Zander 2007). Zander's findings have been sharply criticised in anthroposophical quarters. Probably the weightiest criticism comes from the Stuttgart philosopher, Jörg Ewertowski. He questioned the narrowness of Zander's historical perspective with its leanings towards the thinking of Otto Gerhard Oexle (Ewertowski 2007; 2008, p. 100ff.; 2011, p. 221). But that would have been of little interest to anyone except a few specialists. To all intents and purposes, the monumental work of Helmut Zander had detailed the activities of the Theosophical Society in Germany with acerbic precision and located Steiner firmly at the centre of them. A very satisfying outcome, if only for the fact that it reinforced what everyone already knew. Hardly anyone noticed that the conclusions Zander came to had less to do with the precision and abundance of his observations, than with the countless presumptions, insinuations and mocking, often malicious comments with which his imposing work was peppered. Equally unremarked was the fact that Zander's freely admitted assump-

tion that Steiner's advocacy of the super-sensible was simply the imposition of an ideological superstructure left out of account what for anthroposophists was the heart of the matter. Nor did anyone wonder how such an apparently questionable construct as Steiner's spiritual world could possibly have produced such an astounding abundance of things that worked – a fact which, then as now, can no longer be denied. May I at this point insert what for me was the single most significant objection I had at the first appearance of the two volumes of "Anthroposophie in Deutschland": "The powerful personality that one quite naturally assumes to be behind any long-lastingly productive spiritual movement is nowhere to be found in Zander's pages. Instead, his voluminous work is haunted by a diffuse shadow, a pitiful, morally dubious featherbrain, driven by insecurity and ambition. How such a creature is to display the energy and competence required to start such a movement remains a complete mystery. Zander has performed the feat of totally eliminating from his narrative the genius of Rudolf Steiner."

In his new book, "Anthroposophy", Zander portrays in a sequence of loosely connected essays, a "bouquet of selective impressions" (p. 12), the current picture of the movement inaugurated by Steiner. Since the well-known SPIEGEL article of more than thirty years ago (Brügge 1984), this is the first attempt, from an external perspective, to risk a critical survey of the whole range of anthroposophical activities as they have developed since Steiner's death. Evidently the question his original work of 2007 left unanswered as to the connection between Steiner's teachings and their practical effectiveness would not let the author be. While here he has still not managed to

shed any light on the subject, the reader is nonetheless encouraged by an impressive abundance of carefully researched and meticulously backed-up information, some of which will be new even to insiders, to at least think about it. Zander has organised his observations under alphabetical headings, from *Al-natura* to *Waldorf education and worldview – religion – science*. We learn about *Judith von Halle*, about the *constitutional debate* within the Anthroposophical Society, about *races and racism*, about *sexuality* and the relationship between *men and women* within the anthroposophical milieu. There is also up-to-date information on topics that would interest the editors of BILD (the German equivalent of the SUN). Particularly impressive are the short pieces on anthroposophical *banks*, on *universities* set up by followers of Steiner, on bio-dynamic (Demeter) *agriculture*, on *medicines, cosmetics, curative education, hospitals*. In the essay looking in general at anthroposophy in practice there is a, for me, stunning remark about the diversity of these activities: “Every Waldorf school, every bio-dynamic farm and every anthroposophical clinic has its own profile. Indeed anthroposophists insist that every practical enterprise is an ‘individuality’. And the fact is that outsiders rarely manage to get a proper idea of this intra-anthroposophical pluralism. Anthroposophy commands a rich range of facets, the like of which other small religious or like-minded communities can only dream about” (Zander 2019, p. 187). With as much clarity as could be wished, this observation contradicts the widespread cliché that all anthroposophical establishments are regulated by a monolithic, central authority, located largely in Dornach.

A rich seam of Zander's new work are the numerous footnotes, with their references to further material in the internet. Here are quoted a number of dissertations and masters theses dealing with problems in the anthroposophical milieu. At least studies of this kind seem now to be permissible, albeit tucked away in inconspicuous corners. Zander himself continues to shy away from the key question of the anthroposophical “super-structure” supposedly invented by Steiner. He almost entirely overlooks all the thorough consideration devoted to this subject by anthroposophists themselves. Under the heading *reincarnation*, for instance, neither Emil Bock's classic study (Bock 1996) nor the well-founded “*Philosophie der Wiederverkörperung*” (“*Philosophy of Reincarnation*”) by Renatus Ziegler, one of the most competent philosophers of the anthroposophi-

cal movement, receives as much as a mention. For Helmut Zander, who as a theologian has thoroughly researched this tricky subject, the latter would be an ideal person to discuss it with. But apparently such a person is not supposed to exist.

One obvious candidate for inclusion here – *Goethe* – is missing entirely. The impressive profusion of publications about Steiner and the “Copernicus and Kepler of the organic world”, which anthroposophically inclined experts and other scholars have been churning out for decades, is resolutely ignored by Zander. As with his major work of 2007, however, the most glaring omission remains his failure to address Steiner's theory of knowledge, as contained in the book “*Von Seelenrätseln*” (“*Riddles of the Soul*”), his fundamental declaration of epistemological principle of 1917, in “*Die psychologischen Grundlagen und die erkenntnistheoretische Stellung der Theosophie*” (“*The psychological principles and epistemological status of theosophy*”), a lecture (oft-quoted by anthroposophists) given at the International Philosophy Congress in Bologna in 1911, and in the collections of later essays on anthroposophical research methods (Steiner 1961 and 1965). All these texts, by which Steiner brought his 1905 project of a “theory of esoteric scientific knowledge” to gradual realisation, deserve much more thorough discussion than they have hitherto been granted (Kiersch 2016).

In “*Riddles of the Soul*” Steiner delineates the relationship between empirical research, which takes sensory perception as its point of departure (and which he somewhat arbitrarily designates as “anthropology”), and his own “anthroposophy”, which begins from super-sensory experience. These two research methods seem, at first glance, to be as different as black from white and completely incompatible. Both, however, arrive through logical thinking at a picture of the human being, and if we proceed in an impartial way the pictures thus achieved are, he contends, compatible in every detail, like positive and negative photographic plates (Steiner 1983, p. 11ff.).¹

1. Possibly the first anthroposophist (certainly in the English-speaking world) to draw particular attention to the significance of “*Riddles of the Soul*” was Owen Barfield. A new edition of his “*The Case for Anthroposophy*”, which incorporates his translation of Steiner's text, came out in 2010 (Barfield Press).

This makes particularly clear that with his whole approach Steiner had no intention of replacing the open-ended, never-finalised research process, that Zander quite rightly identifies as the key feature of modern science, with a dogmatic system of absolute anthroposophical truths, as is still regularly asserted, not least by Helmut Zander himself. In "Riddles of the Soul", through engaging with the arguments of an opponent, the aesthetician Max Dessoir, and of a potential partner in dialogue, the philosopher Franz Brentano, Steiner gives an exemplary model of how such an interchange could proceed. In the book's appendix he then outlines research findings of his own, among them his discovery of the nature of the relationship the three soul capacities of thinking, feeling and will have to the human body and "spirit". This is of fundamental importance especially for anthroposophists involved in education and various forms of therapy, and has accordingly been widely adopted and applied, and its implications worked out in detail (Lutzker & Zdrzil 2019, with wide-ranging references). There is nothing of the kind to be found in the annals of Blavatsky-style theosophy. The central ideas of this Steiner had derived from his study of Goethe's organicism, and from many years of meditation upon the symbolic images in the latter's "Fairy Tale" from his "Tales of German Emigrants" (Kiersch 2011). What induces a competent historian like Helmut Zander to pass over all this without comment?

The conceptual framework of the sociology of science we owe to a Polish medical doctor by the name of Ludwik Fleck gives us a useful lead in coming to grips with this skewed state of affairs. As early as 1935 he had been reflecting on how scientific findings are arrived at, and the unexpected changes they go through. He describes how scientific dialogue, right down to the presentation of "facts", is influenced by unconscious prejudices, assumptions and attitudes, by a specific "style of thinking", that develops in the course of time among the members of a particular "thought community", and, under the leadership of certain prominent "initiates" (sic!), compels all newcomers to conform (Fleck 1980, p. 129ff.). Using the observation of a bacterial culture through a microscope as an example – a procedure with which he, as a serologist, was very familiar – he shows how in the absence of clarifying concepts the observational field is at first confusingly multi-faceted, how from this profusion the skilled observer then selects details he recognises, while deliberately

ignoring others, how discussion among experts gradually clarifies what is important and out of this arises a "journal science" characterised by open questions, uncertainties and suppositions, how its provisional results then take shape as "handbook science", and finally enter the sphere of "textbook science", where only the solidly proven "facts" appear. Every science follows this path: from the sensing of a vague, confusing reality at the beginning of the research to the forming of concepts, established inevitably in terms of an unquestioned "style of thinking", and regarded as the truth by the general public. This goes for Steiner's anthroposophy as much as for every particular science competing with other possible interpretations in the field of debate within the modern scientific community. The way the lay public accepts the authoritative – even if in principle provisional – pronouncements of science as proven truth is exactly the same as the way the tradition-bound community of anthroposophical fellow-believers accepts the contents of Rudolf Steiner's Collected Works as such. It does not follow from this that Steiner himself regarded his ideas or research findings as having absolute validity, as Zander purports to have proven.

Fleck's observations on the relationship between the esoteric circles of those "in the know" and the esoteric mass of the lay public are particularly interesting for the purpose of understanding the position of a researcher like Helmut Zander. Those who know, according to Fleck, do not simply instruct, they also adjust themselves to the expectations of their audience. This insight sheds a very informative light on certain irrational trends in the modern media, such as their poll-fetish and measurability mania. But also on the methods of Helmut Zander. The successful Steiner-researcher has to take account of the widespread feeling that it's up to him to make sure Steiner, the theosophical "guru", is exposed. Anything that contradicts this feeling must be left out of the picture.

This need not imply that in discreetly passing over certain problem areas Zander is actively seeking to discredit Steiner or his supporters. As a member of the thought-collective of the modern scientific community he simply cannot but proceed as he does. What is irritating, however, is the apparent naivety with which he bases his utterances about what he confidently assumes to be the basic features of modern scientific research squarely upon the unshakable validity of ideas belonging to another time,

and thus upon a style of thinking that has long been in question. It is now many years since Gernot Böhme proclaimed “the end of the Baconian age” (Böhme 1993). Highly regarded nonconformists like Paul Feyerabend with his posthumously published “Naturphilosophie” (Feyerabend 2018), the American philosopher Thomas Nagel with his study “Mind and Cosmos” (Nagel 2013) have raised serious doubts (this is just the tip of a very large iceberg). And the current debates on the appalling ecological and economic consequences of the hitherto reigning scientific paradigm can only add to them. In his authoritative work of 2007 Helmut Zander

very successfully portrayed the circumstances under which Steiner's anthroposophy was able to develop, especially the life histories and specific contributions of those involved. This new book bears the same stamp, and for this we should be grateful to him. But his central thesis, that Steiner's life's work was nothing more than a sort of worm-cast of Blavatsky-style theosophy, is just as questionable as it ever was. The sub-title of the new book is misleading. Zander has sensitively and knowledgeably portrayed *Weleda, Demeter, Waldorf education* and the milieu in which they blossomed, but still has not done the same for *Rudolf Steiner's ideas*.

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